Essays on trade liberalization with firm heterogeneity by Vashchilko, Aleksandr
ESSAYS ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH FIRM HETEROGENEITY
By
Aleksandr Vashchilko
Dissertation
Submitted to the faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulllment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
Economics
December, 2008
Nashville, Tennessee
Approved:
Eric Bond
Mario Crucini
Kevin Huang
Mikhael Shor
Benjamin Zissimos
To my son, Peter
To my daughter, Marta
and
To my wife, Tatiana
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to my advisor, Eric Bond, and the members of my dissertation
committee: Mario Crucini, Kevin Huang, Mikhael Shor, and Benjamin Zissimos
for their suggestions and guidance.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENT
Page
DEDICATION............................................................................................ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................iii
LIST OF FIGURES....................................................................................v
Chapter
I TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR..........1
Introduction..........................................................................................1
Preferences and endowment structure...................................................2
Equilibrium in a di¤erentiated product sector......................................3
Equilibrium in a homogeneous product sector.......................................11
Overall equilibrium..............................................................................11
Free trade.............................................................................................14
Autarky.........................................................................................14
Free trade......................................................................................17
Costly trade..........................................................................................19
Conclusion............................................................................................28
II TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS.30
Introduction.........................................................................................30
Preferences, endowment structure and production structure.................31
Overall equilibrium...............................................................................32
Welfare implications of transition from autarky to free trade...............33
Costly trade..........................................................................................36
Conclusion............................................................................................42
APPENDIX.................................................................................................44
REFERENCES............................................................................................65
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. All rms export (di = xi)..............................................................7
2. Firms divided into exporters and non-exporters (di < xi)............7
3. Change in cuto¤s, when country 1 has relatively more of Sector 1 - type
capital.............................................................................................................41
4. Change in cuto¤s, when country 1 has relatively more of sector 2 - type
capital........................................................................................................41
5. Determination of w..........................................................................46
6. Changes in x1 and w, when  2 decreases........................................57
v
INTRODUCTION
This study responds to important considerations prior to implementing trade
liberalization. We consider how trade liberalization inuences the distribution
of rms over three dimensions: productivity, size (amounts of employed factors),
and collected revenue/prot. Specically, we look at the spillover e¤ects of trade
liberalization in one sector on the average productivity of rms in the other
sector. We study how trade liberalization a¤ects the number of rms (and a
share of exporting rms) in di¤erent sectors. Finally, we analyze how trade
liberalization leads to short-run changes in the welfare of owners of di¤erent
factors used in production and the reallocation of factors across sectors.
The short-run e¤ects of changes in trade policy on the owners of di¤erent
production factors in a small economy are often analyzed using the specic-
factors model (Jones, 1971; Mayer,1974; Mussa, 1974; Neary, 1978). The specic
factor model is a two sector model in which each sector produces a homogeneous
good using a sector specic factor and a factor that is mobile between sectors.
The prices of goods, produced in both sectors, are exogenously given, since the
assumption is that the countrys economy is small, relative to the economy of
the rest of the world. Perfect competition is assumed to be the market structure
in both sectors of the model. Jones, 1971, established the magnication e¤ect
of the changes in commodity prices with respect to the prices of sector-specic
factors. Particularly, with percentage changes in sector prices: bp1, bp2, changes in
factor prices satisfy to br1 > bp1 > w > bp2 > br2. Trade liberalization leads to an
increase in the ratio of domestic price of the exported commodity to domestic
price of imported commodity. This increases the ratio of rental on capital to
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the commodity price in the exporting sector and decreases the ratio of rental
on capital to the commodity price in the importing sector. As result, the owner
of capital in the exporting sector can buy more of both goods, and the owner
of capital in the importing sector can buy less of both goods. The owners of
labor can buy more of the imported good and less of the exported good, as
the percentage change in wage rate is bounded by the percentage changes in
commodity prices. Whether or not labor owners welfare increases or decreases
depends on the share of the imported good in consumption. As trade liberalizes,
labor moves partially from the importing sector to the exporting sector.
Even though the traditional specic-factors framework is used often for the
analysis of the short-run e¤ects of trade liberalization, it can not account for
some stylized facts about international trade. One stylized fact suggests sub-
stantial intra-industry trade among industrialized countries that has grown over
time (Balassa, 1966, and Grubel, 1967). In the recent literature, this fact nds
support as well. For example, Helpman, 1999, points out that the share of
intra-industry trade among for many European countries increased substantially
between 1970 and 1990. This fact can not be explained within the traditional
framework (specic-factors model), as no place exists for two-way trade within
sector producing a homogeneous good. Moreover the gravity equation, that
performs well in data, could be justied theoretically through monopolistic com-
petition market structure, that is usually used to model intra-industry trade
(Bergstrand, 1989).
Krugman, 1979, addressed intra-industry trade in a one sector model with
monopolistic competition market structure. In this framework every rm, though
employing the same technology, produces di¤erent variety. Since there are many
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varieties on the market, the changes in the price of one variety have no e¤ect on
the demand for another variety. In this sense, the rm, setting the price for the
variety it produces, behaves as a monopolist. It happens that in transition from
autarky to free trade, the price of any variety relative to the wage rate decreases.
Moreover, the number of varieties increases with the transition from autarky to
free trade.
Krugman, 1981, has the framework with two sectors, two countries and the
monopolistic competition market structure in both sectors. The model has sector
specic factors only and no mobile factors. Krugman, 1981, found that in the
comparative disadvantage sector, the return to the xed factor decreases with
trade liberalization (transition from autarky to free trade). At the same time,
in the comparative advantage sector, the return to the xed factor increases
with trade liberalization. Undoubtedly, the owner of the factor in comparative
advantage sector is better o¤ with trade liberalization. The owner of the factor
in comparative disadvantage sector can be better o¤ or worth o¤with transition
from autarky to free trade. If the elasticity of the demand is smaller than certain
threshold, then the owner of the scarce factors is better o¤ in course of transition
from autarky to free trade. For the elasticity of demand above this threshold, the
owner of scarce factors is better o¤ if the factor proportions are similar. And the
owner of scarce factor becomes worth o¤ with trade liberalization if the factor
proportions are more di¤erent.
It is worth to compare Krugman, 1981, framework with the traditional spe-
cic factor model. Lets point out the di¤erence between these models in rst
place. Krugman, 1981, model is two countries, two sectors model with sector
specic factors only. The traditional specic factors model is the small open econ-
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omy model with two sector specic factors and one mobile factor. The principal
di¤erence between these models is dened by the market structure. Traditional
sector specic model has perfect competition market structure, while Krugman,
1981, framework has monopolistic competition market structure.
With trade liberalization (decrease in trade costs), the ratio of domestic price
of the exported commodity to domestic price of imported commodity increases
in the traditional specic factors model. Also, the ratio of the price of any
variety in comparative advantage sector to the price of any variety in comparative
disadvantage sector increase with trade liberalization (transition from autarky
to free trade) in Krugman, 1981, framework. The di¤erence from traditional
specic factors model is that in every sector a country imports some varieties and
exports the varieties produced domestically. At the same time, country becomes
net exporter in comparative advantage sector and net importer in comparative
disadvantage sector. So, the price of any variety in the sector, where country will
be net exporter, relative to the price of any variety in the sector, where country
will be net importer, increases in Krugman, 1981, framework.
We have the magnication e¤ect, which is similar to the one in the tradi-
tional specic factors model, in Krugman, 1981, framework. Specically, with
transition from autarky to free trade the ratio of the return to sector specic
factor to the price of any variety within the same sector increase in comparative
advantage sector and decreases in comparative disadvantage sector. As result,
the owner of the factor of production in comparative advantage sector is able to
buy more of every variety he/she consumed before trade liberalization. In ad-
dition to this e¤ect, the number of available for consumption varieties increase
with transition from autarky to free trade. At the same time, the owner of the
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factor of production in comparative disadvantage sector will be able to purchase
less of every variety he/she consumed before trade liberalization. But, the num-
ber of available varieties increases with trade liberalization. The increase in the
number of available for consumption varieties (variety e¤ect) can compensate
the negative magnication e¤ect in comparative disadvantage sector. The vari-
ety e¤ect is larger, the smaller is the elasticity of demand and more similar are
the factor proportions.
Another stylized fact for which the traditional approach does not account is
the existence of considerable heterogeneity of rms with respect to productivity.
The considerable heterogeneity of rms with respect to productivity is one of the
features of the international trade system, and some of the studies have provided
insights into the behavior of rms, depending on their productivity. Clerides,
Lach, & Tybout, 1998, did not nd the evidence in the support of the fact
that exporting might cause improvements in productivity because of learning
by exporting. Conversely, rms with high productivity self-select themselves for
exporting. Also, Bernard, & Jensen, 1999, support the fact that rms self-select
themselves into exporting. Consequently, Aw, Chung, & Roberts, 2000, showed
that trade liberalization forces the least productive rms to exit the market.
Both these stylized facts have been addressed in Melitz, 2003. Melitz, 2003,
has introduced heterogeneous rms on the top of monopolistic competition mar-
ket structure by Krugman, 1979, in one sector model with many countries. He
found that with trade liberalization the average productivity of rms increase,
since less productive rms leave the market. In this case, trade liberalization
(the decrease in the xed trade cost or the decrease in the variable trade cost)
leads to the increase in the value of the smallest productivity among the rms
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on the market.
Bond, 1986, introduces the heterogeneity of rms with respect to productiv-
ity in the setup of the two sector model with two mobile factors, keeping the
small economy assumption. In Bond, 1986, setup, price taking rms produce
homogenous commodity. Firms are associated with entrepreneurs they are run
by. And the entrepreneurial ability denes the rms productivity. The rm
with smallest productivity on the market is the one making the prot that is
equal to the wage rate earned by entrepreneur when he is employed by any other
rm. Since, rms produce the homogeneous commodity, there is no subdivision
of rms into exporters and non-exporters as well as intra-industry trade is not
modeled.
Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, extended Melitz, 2003, framework to two
sectors model that has two countries and two mobile factors of production in
both countries. Or, equivalently, they extended Heckscher-Ohlin model with
two countries by changing the market structure from perfect competition to mo-
nopolistic competition with heterogeneous rms. They analyzed in detail the
transition from autarky to costly trade state with the xed trade cost, variable
trade cost and xed production cost being the same across sectors. They found
that average productivity of rms increases in both sectors with transition from
autarky to costly trade. Moreover, the average productivity increases more in
comparative advantage sector than in comparative disadvantage sector. In a
sense they found that the exogenous comparative advantage is magnied by the
changes in average productivity of rms in a course of transition from autarky
to costly trade. Also, Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, found that the average
productivity of rms exporting some of their output abroad decreases more in
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comparative advantage sector than in comparative disadvantage sector. While
adding to the standard model with two countries and two sectors, having the
mobile factors of production, monopolistic competition market structure with
heterogeneous rms, Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, found that the relative
nominal reward of abundant factor rises and relative nominal reward of scarce
factor fall in the course of transition from autarky to costly trade. So, changing
the market structure of the standard model from perfect competition to mo-
nopolistic competition with heterogenous rms does not alter the results on the
direction of the changes in the relative nominal reward of factors of production.
We study the e¤ect of trade liberalization (reduction in variable trade cost)
in the sector specic factors model with two countries, that has monopolistic
competition market structure with heterogeneous rms at least in one of the
sectors. Particularly, the e¤ect of the trade liberalization (the reduction in trade
costs) in one sector on average productivity of the rms in the other sector has
not been analyzed before. We would like to stress that the decrease in variable
trade cost, while being at costly trade state, is the type of trade liberalization we
analyze. This is very realistic case, since relatively few countries will experience
the transition from autarky to costly trade (the type of trade liberalization an-
alyzed in Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007) in foreseeable future. In the sector
1, we have monopolistic competition market structure with heterogenous rms
of Melitz, 2003, type. We are exploring the e¤ect of the reduction in trade cost
in sector 2 on average productivity of rms in sector 1 across countries as well
as on the average productivity of exporting rms in sector 1 across countries.
In addition, we explore the changes in the return to the factors of production
when trade costs decrease in sector 2 in two countries, two sectors model with
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monopolistic competition market structure and heterogeneous rms in sector 1.
We explore two setups of the model in detail. In chapter I, we assume that
the market structure of sector 2 is the one of perfect competition. This case
corresponds to the reduction of trade costs in the sector with homogeneous com-
modity and perfect competition market structure. The agricultural sector is a
good example of the sector with perfect competition market structure and homo-
geneous commodity. Because of trade liberalization, the trade costs have been
reduced substantially in the number of sectors in the recent history. The tari¤s
in agricultural sector have not been reduced substantially. At the same time, the
negotiation on tari¤ reduction in the agricultural sector is in progress. Analyzing
the decrease in the trade costs in sector 2 with the perfect competition market
structure and homogeneous good allows for the predictions about the e¤ects of
potential trade liberalization in agricultural sector on average productivity of
rms in the other sectors as well as other variables of interest. Moreover, the
changes in trade costs associated with the changes in transportations costs could
be analyzed in this framework as well.
The changes in trade costs inuence the average productivity of rms within
sector 1 of every country as well as the average productivity of exporting rms
there. The increase in the average productivity of rms within sector 1 of par-
ticular country is caused by the exit of the rms with very low productivity.
Similarly, the increase in the average productivity of exporting rms in sector
1 of particular country is caused by the exit of the exporting rms with low
productivity from foreign market. The decrease in the average productivity of
rms is caused by the successful entry of the rms with productivity smaller
than the productivity of the least productive rm in the steady state before the
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changes in the trade costs. Similarly, the decrease in the average productivity
of exporting rms is caused by the successful entry to the foreign market of the
rms with productivity smaller than the productivities of exporting rms before
trade liberalization.
The main contribution of this work is that it provides the cross-sectorial
e¤ects of the trade liberalization in one sector on the average productivity of
rms (exporting rms) in the other sector in each country. It is interesting that
the e¤ect of trade liberalization in sector 2 on the average productivity of rms
in sector 1 of particular country depends on whether the sector 1 of this country
is of comparative advantage or of comparative disadvantage. In the case, the
country has the comparative disadvantage in sector 1, the average productivity
of rms in sector 1 there decreases with trade liberalization in sector 2. While the
average productivity of exporting rms in the sector 1 of this country increases
in this case. Conversely, if the country has comparative advantage in sector 1,
the average productivity of rms in sector 1 of this country, increases with trade
liberalization in sector 2. And the average productivity of exporting rms in
sector 1 of this country decreases in this case.
In addition to these new ndings, we state that the return to sector specic
capital rises in comparative advantage sector and decreases in comparative dis-
advantage. This result agrees with the predictions of two countries, two sectors
specic factors model, when both sectors have the perfect competition market
structure. Also, the average productivity of rms in sector 1 of each country de-
creases in response to the decrease in the variable trade cost in sector 1. And the
average productivity of exporting rms within sector 1 of every country decreases
with the decrease in the variable trade cost in this sector. This observation again
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agrees with Melitz, 2003.
In chapter II, we assume that the market structure of sector 2 is of monopolis-
tic competition with heterogeneous rms as the one in sector 1. This framework
allows for the analysis of the e¤ect of trade liberalization in the sector with
di¤erentiated commodity on the other sectors with di¤erentiated commodities.
The modied framework is used for exploring the mechanism of the e¤ect of
trade liberalization in one sector on the average productivity of rms (exporting
rms) in the other sector, when both sectors are of monopolistic competition
market structure with heterogeneous rms. This framework enables the analysis
of trade liberalization in the apparel sector on soft drinks industry. We have
analyzed the specic case of this framework, when the comparative advantage
is driven by the di¤erences in sector specic capital. In this case, the results
about the spillover e¤ect of trade liberalization on average productivity of the
rms in the other sector of particular country do not change from the case when
market structure di¤ers across sectors (perfect competition in one sector and
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous rms in the other).
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CHAPTER I
TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Introduction
The specic-factors framework is traditionally used to analyze the short-run
e¤ects of trade liberalization. Some sectors are well characterized by the homo-
geneity of the produced commodity. The agricultural sector is a good example of
such sector. At the same time, other sectors are better characterized by hetero-
geneity of rms and product di¤erentiation. Di¤erent types of industries, such
as apparel industry, are the good examples of such sectors.
Product di¤erentiation is usually used to explain inta-industry trade among
countries. It was introduced through monopolistic competition market structure
in one sector model (Krugman, 1979). Melitz, 2003, introduced heterogeneous
rms to the monopolistic competition market structure by Krugman, 1979 in
order to account for the rm heterogeneity with respect to productivity that was
found in data.
For quite a long time, tari¤s were reduced substantially in manufacturing
sectors but not in the agricultural sector. Given high tari¤s in agricultural
sector, there is a high potential for welfare improvement that would come with
lowering them. Also, there is a question how such trade liberalization might
e¤ect the sectors that exhibit rm heterogeneity and product di¤erentiation.
I am going to modify the traditional specic-factors framework by introducing
the monopolistic competition market structure with heterogenous rms in one
of the sectors. And then, I am going to study the e¤ect of trade liberalization
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in homogeneous commodity sector on di¤erent economic indicators, such as the
average productivity of rms in countrys sector with di¤erentiated commodity,
the average productivity of rms there exporting abroad, and factor prices. Also,
having homogeneous commodity with perfect competition market structure in
the sector where trade liberalization occurs and monopolistic competition market
structure with heterogenous rms in the sector a¤ected by the spillover e¤ect of
this trade liberalization will allow for more explicit analysis of the mechanism of
the spillover e¤ect in general equilibrium framework.
Preferences and endowment structure
The analysis of trade liberalization uses a two country, two sector model
in which country i has Li endowment of labor and Kil endowment of sector l
type capital. We begin with a description of the preferences of representative
consumers and an outline of the production structure follows. We conclude with
a description of the rms entrance and exit in steady state. The words industry
and sector are interchangeable.
Each country has two sectors. Sector 1 is the di¤erentiated product sector
and sector 2 is the homogeneous product sector. Many varieties of commodity are
produced in sector 1, while the homogeneous commodity is produced in sector
2. The utility function of a representative consumer is:
Ui =
"Z
j2
i1
qi1 (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
#
Q1 i2 , (1)
where qi1 (j) denotes the consumption of variety, j, produced in industry, 1,
by the representative consumer in country, i. 
i1 is the set of all available
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varieties within industry, 1. Qi2 is the consumption of sector 2 commodity. 
corresponds to the portion of total expenditures that goes toward the varieties
in sector 1.  > 1 restricts substitutability between varieties in sector 1. The
utility of a representative consumer increases in the number of varieties and in
their quantities. Taste in both countries for variety produced in the other country
generates two-way trade within industry 1.
These preferences generate the following demand for variety j:
qi (j) =
pi (j)
 
P 1 i
Ii, (2)
where Ii is the income of a representative consumer in country, i, and Pi =hR
j2
i1 pi (j)
1  dj
i 1
1 
is the price index (the inverse measure of the degree of
competition), that in an additive way includes the prices of all varieties produced
in sector, 1, which are available for consumption in country, i. Because of the
continuum of varieties, changes in the price of any variety would have no e¤ect
on the price index and likewise on demand for other varieties. As such, there is
no strategic interaction between rms producing di¤erent varieties.
Finally, the demand for the homogeneous good from consumers in country i
is
Qi2 =
(1  ) Ii
pi2
, (3)
where pi2 is commodity price.
Equilibrium in a di¤erentiated product sector
As in Krugman, 1979, the assumption is that upon entering a market, a rm
in sector 1 can costlessly di¤erentiate its variety from those already existing in
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the market. Thus, a rm would rather produce a variety di¤erent from those
already in the market, so that rm does not share the demand for this variety
with another rm. Since no strategic interaction is present among rms, each
rm behaves as a monopolist in setting the price for its variety domestically or
abroad.
Every active rm in sector 1 uses Cobb-Douglas production function with
productivity parameter, , which di¤ers across rms. When producing quantity,
qdi, for a domestic market and quantity, qxi, for a foreign market, a rm pays
the variable costs, ci1

qdi and  1 ci1 qxi, where the variable trade cost,  1   1,
enters in an "iceberg" form, and ci1 = w
1
i r
1 1
i1 is the unit cost not adjusted
for e¢ ciency. As a monopolist for variety it produces, the rm sets prices with
a constant markup over marginal cost domestically and/or abroad pdi () = ci1
and pxi () =  1 ci1 , where  =
 1

.
A rm collects variable prot, Rdi()

, from domestic market and variable
prot, Rxi()

, from foreign market, where
Rdi () =
h
Pi
ci1
i 1
1Ii; Rxi () =
h
Pk
1ci1
i 1
1Ik. (4)
Other things being equal, higher variable trade cost leads to lower revenue
collected from the foreign market. Moreover, the revenue is proportional to the
income and to the sector price index (inverse measures of competition) of the
country, where the variety is sold.
In order to produce output, a rm in sector 1, pays a xed cost, fci1 which
is proportional to the unit cost. In addition to this xed cost, the rm must pay
an additional xed cost, fxci1, if it exports. A rm pays xed production cost
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and xed exporting cost when serving both markets and when serving foreign
market only. At the same time, by serving foreign market only, a rm does not
collect positive variable prot from a domestic market, that would be collected
otherwise. Therefore, the rm will choose to serve a domestic market only or
to serve both markets. A rm serves foreign market in addition to the domestic
market, if the variable prot from selling in a foreign market is higher than the
xed cost of exporting (Rxi()

> fxci1). The resulting expression for the rms
prot is as in Melitz, 2003:
i () = di () + max fxi () , 0g , (5)
where di () =
Rdi()

  fci1 and xi () = Rxi()   fxci1. di () is the rms
prot when serving domestic market only. And xi () is the increase in the
prot that comes from exporting.
In steady state equilibrium, the factor prices, price indexes, incomes and the
distribution of active rms over productivity remain constant over time.
An unbounded pool of identical rms have no knowledge of their future pro-
ductivity before entering the market. The only information available to poten-
tial entrants about future productivity is the distribution (with distribution and
density functions, G () and g ()) from which they will draw productivity after
paying xed entry cost, feci1, which is thereafter unretrievable. After the rms
productivity is realized, it remains constant over time. If the rms productivity
leads to a negative prot per period, the rm exits the market. Otherwise, after
entry, the rm remains in the market and faces every period the possibility of
been forced to leave the market because of external negative shock, that occurs
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with probability  each period. Following Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, I
assume that factor intensities in entry, production and exporting are the same.
Since Rdi () and Rxi () increase in productivity, di () and xi () increase
in productivity as well. Since di (0) =  fci1 and i () is positive for su¢ ciently
large productivity, unique di satisfying i (di) = 0. The rm with productivity
above di earns positive prot every period and remains in the market after
entry. Contrarily, a rm with productivity below di earns negative prot and
exits immediately after entry. Further, di will be referred to as zero-prot
productivity cuto¤.
Following Melitz, 2003, I dene xi = inf f :   di and xi ()  0g. An
active rm with productivity above xi (which would be referred to as exporting
productivity cuto¤) exports. Zero-prot productivity cuto¤ might coincide
with exporting productivity cuto¤ (Figure 1). In this case, all active rms within
sector 1 export. This happens, when active rms with su¢ ciently low produc-
tivity collect negative prots when serving domestic market only, but gain a
su¢ ciently high increase in prot from exporting resulting in the positive total
prot. If xi > di, then rms divide into exporters and non-exporters (Figure
2). Firms with productivity above di, but below xi, sell in a domestic market
only, while rms with productivity above xi sell in both domestic and export
markets. In this case, rms with low productivity do not attain the increase in
prot from exporting and serve a domestic market only, while rms with high
productivity receive the increase in prot from exporting and serve both mar-
kets. Further, we will concentrate on the case when rms in both countries are
divided into non-exporters and exporters. Zero-prot productivity cuto¤and ex-
porting productivity cuto¤ are determined by conditions Rdi (di) = fci1 and
6
1i
xi
di
di
1
f x c i1
f c i1
Figure 1: All rms export (di = xi)
1
i
xi
di
xi
1
di
1
f x c i1
f c i1
Figure 2: Firms divided into exporters and non-exporters (di < xi)
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Rxi (xi) = fxci1. Property
Rl(
0)
Rl(
00) =
h
0
00
i 1
in combination with the expres-
sions for Rdi (di) and Rxi (xi) leads to the expressions for the revenue of the
rm with productivity  on the domestic market and foreign market:
Rdi () =
h

di
i 1
fci1; Rxi () =
h

xi
i 1
fxci1. (6)
The value of entering, for a rm, would be equal to the stream of per pe-
riod prots discounted by the probability of staying in the market: Vi () =P1
t=0 (1  )t i () = i() . Given the uncertainty about future productivity,
the expected value of entering the market for a potential entrant would be equal
to: Vi =
[1 G(di)]

[di + {ixi]. The potential entrant factors in the probability of
making a positive per period prot, 1 G (di). The average prot includes the
average prot collected from the domestic market, di, and the average increase
in prot that comes with exporting, xi, weighted by the probability that a rm
selling domestically exports, {i = 1 G(xi)1 G(di) .
Since there is an unbounded pool of potential entrants, the value of entering
any sector is equal to the entry cost in this sector. Free entry condition is:
[1 G (di)]

[di + {ixi] = feci1. (7)
Before entering a market, a potential entrant forms expectations for the
probability of successful entrance (the probability of making positive prot) and
prot, given a successful entry. The expectations are based on the information
about factor prices, price indexes, distribution from which the productivity is
drawn and aggregate income in every country. This information determines the
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zero-prot productivity cuto¤s and exporting productivity cuto¤s. In turn, the
distribution of all active rms in any countrys sector and the distribution of
exporting rms in any countrys sector will be determined by corresponding pro-
ductivity cuto¤s, since all active rms face the same exogenous probability, ,
of exiting after every period. Finally, these distributions provide the basis for
nding the probability of successful entrance and the average prot, given a
successful entrance.
The expressions (6) for revenues in combination with expressions for compo-
nents of rms prot di () and xi () lead to the following expression for free
entry condition:
f

1Z
di
h

di
i 1
  1

g () d+ fx

1Z
xi
h

xi
i 1
  1

g () d = fe. (8)
The same intensity of factors usage in entry and production, as well as con-
stant elasticity of demand, lead to the fact that unit cost cancels out of expression
(8) corresponding to free entry condition.
The expression (8) shows the relationship between zero-prot productivity
cuto¤, di, and exporting productivity cuto¤, xi, in a sector 1 of country i.
The expected prot collected domestically, (1 G (di))di, decreases with the
increase in di. At the same time, the increase in the expected prot from
exporting, (1 G (xi))xi, decreases with the increase in xi. Since the sum of
these two components should be equal to xed entry cost, zero-prot productivity
cuto¤, di, and exporting productivity cuto¤, xi, in sector 1 of country i move
in opposite directions.
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Here are the factors leading to the expected prot collected domestically be-
ing decreasing in di. According to the expression (6) for Rdi (), the increase
in di implies that active rm with  collects smaller revenue and contributes to
di being decreasing in di. In addition, higher zero-prot productivity cuto¤,
di, reduces the probability of successful entrance, 1   G (di). This, in turn,
contributes to di being decreasing in di. At the same time, the averaging will
be done over smaller interval, so Rdi () will be weighted with larger weights,
g()
1 G(di) , which contribute to di being increasing in di. The e¤ect of the increase
in di on
g()
1 G(di) is dominated, leading to the expected prot collected domesti-
cally being decreasing in di. Similar reasoning establishes that the increase in
expected prot from exporting is decreasing in xi.
In steady-state equilibrium, the mass of rms successfully entering a countrys
sector is equal to the mass of rms exiting the same sector. The following
condition should hold:
[1 G (di)]Mei = Mi (9)
Equations (7) and (9) imply that the per period prot earned by active rms
in sector 1 of particular country equals the entry cost paid by rms entering sector
1 of this country. As a result, the total revenue collected by rms within sector
1 of particular country is equal to the total expenditures on factors employed
within sector 1 of this country. The demand for sector specic capital from rms
within sector 1 should be equal to its supply Ki1. And, Li1 is the demand for
labor used in production and entry created by rms in sector, 1, of country, i.
Finally, it is assumed that production and trade cost parameters (f , fx, fe,  1,
1) within sector 1 are the same across countries.
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Equilibrium in a homogeneous product sector
The constant returns to scale technology is used in sector 2, with marginal
cost of production to be equal to ci2 = w
2
i r
1 2
i1 . pi2 is price of homogeneous
commodity in country i. With constant return to scale technology, commodity
price, pi2, should be equal to the marginal cost of production, ci2, for non-zero,
nite amount of commodity being produced in equilibrium: pi2 = ci2. This
condition implies that the revenue collected by rms in sector 2 of country i
equals to the expenditures on factors of production employed in sector 2 of this
country.
In addition, the factor prices should bring the equality between the demand
for sector specic capital and its exogenous supply, Ki1. The production of
homogeneous commodity will generate the demand for labor, Li2, to be employed
in sector 2. Finally, the producers in sector 2 of country, exporting its output,
pay the iceberg trade cost  2 on their exports.
Overall equilibrium
The sectors within a country are connected through labor market. The labor
market clearing condition would require that the demand for labor in country i
is equal to its exogenously given supply Li:
Li1 + Li2 = Li (10)
We can establish the connection between unit costs across countries within
11
each sector. When country 1 has comparative advantage in sector 1, it imports
sector 2 commodity.
Because of the trade cost  2, the price of homogeneous commodity in country
1 is higher than the price of homogeneous commodity in country 2: p12 =  2p22.
This leads to
c12
c22
=  2. (11)
Firms selling their output in sector 1 of country 2 face the same conditions in
terms of price index, P2, and countrys income, I2. As result, price index, P2, and
countrys income, I2, drop out from the ratio of revenues in following condition
fc21
fxc11
= Rx2(x2)
Rd1(d1)
. So that, the ratio of unit costs is proportional to the ratio of
cuto¤s:
c21
c11
=
h
d2
x1
i 1

h
fx
f
i 1


 1

1 . (12)
In contrast to the relationship between unit costs in sector 2, the ratio of unit
costs in sector 1 depends on the ratio of the productivity cuto¤s as well as on
trade cost parameters.
Similar condition for rms in sector 1 selling their output in the market of
country, 1, can be derived. In this case, rms selling domestically in country 1
and rms exporting to country 1 face demand for their varieties driven by income
I1 and the price index, P1, of country 1. Combining these expressions produces:
x1x2
d1d2
=  21

fx
f
 2
 1
. (13)
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Since rms are subdivided into exporters and non-exporter in the type of
equilibrium, we analyze, then the inequality  1
h
fx
f
i 1
 1
> 1 should hold.
The expression (13) in combination with expression (8) written for both coun-
tries connects zero-prot productivity cuto¤s and exporting productivity cuto¤s
within sector 1 across countries.
The income of all consumers in country i consists of the return to countrys
endowment of sector-specic capitals and labor, Ii = wiLi+
X
l
rilKil. According
to conditions (7) and (9), the revenue collected by rms in sector, l, of country,
i, is equal to the return to the factors of production employed in this sector,
Iil = wiLil + rilKil. Therefore, the total return to the factors of production
employed in sector, l, in both countries is equal to the expenditures on commodity
produced within this sector. We have the goods market clearing condition:
X
i
Iil = l
X
i
Ii. (14)
Finally, the expenditures by country, i, on goods produced within sector, 1,
Ii, become the returns to the factors of production employed by domestic and
foreign rms, selling their products on country i market.
Ii = iIi1 + [1  k] Ik1. (15)
The part of these expenditures goes to domestic rms and becomes the return
to the factors employed in sector, 1, of country, i, iIi1. i =
Rdi
Ri
is the ratio of
revenue collected domestically to the total revenue of rms within sector, 1, of
country, i. Ii1 is the revenue collected by rms in country i and sector 1, which is
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equal to the return to factors of production employed by these rms. The other
part of these expenditures goes to foreign rms, exporting to country i. These
rms collect [1  k] Ik1. Summing the expression (15) over countries results in
goods market clearing condition (14). In this sense, it is su¢ cient to have the
relationship for expenditures of country 1 on sector 1 only and goods market
clearing condition (14). The conditions outlined in this section determine the
equilibrium.
Free trade
A further consideration is the trade between countries under variable-trade
cost and xed-trade cost being zero. Before exploring this case, an analysis of
autarky comes rst, followed by an analysis of changes in a countrys economy
as it transitions from autarky to free trade.
Autarky
Since in autarky, rms collect prots only on the domestic market, the free
entry condition (8) transforms to
f

1Z
d
"

d
 1
  1
#
g () d = fe. (16)
Notice, that this condition pins down zero prot productivity cuto¤, d. With
the increase in the xed cost of production, f , d increases. At the same time,
the increase in the xed entry cost, fe, leads to the decrease in d.
As demonstrated in the entry/exit part of the model specication, the in-
come spent by consumers on products produced in sector l, lI, is equal to the
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payment to the factors of production employed there, so that lI = wLl + rlKl
(goods market clearing condition). The equality, [1  l]wLl = lrlKl, species
the relationship for the expenditures on factors of production within an industry.
This equality comes from the Cobb-Douglas specication of technology used in
production and entry. This relationship for both industries together with goods
market clearing and labor market clearing condition (10) leads to the determina-
tion of the rentals on capital as well as the allocation of labor across industries
(w is normalized to unity). The Cobb-Douglas specication of technology leads
to the fact, that the allocation of labor across sectors does not depend on the
endowments of sector specic capital:
rl =
1 l
l
Ll
Kl
Ll =
llP
l ll
L
. (17)
As the rentals on sector specic capitals, as well as zero-prot productivity
cuto¤s, solved, the determination of the average revenue, R
e, for every in-
dustry is possible.1 This leads to determination of the number of active rms
M = I1
R(e) , where I1 = wL1+ r1K1 is the return to factors employed in sector 1.
The variables of interest depend on the zero-prot productivity cuto¤ and
the rentals on sector-specic capital. In this model, the zero-prot productiv-
ity cuto¤, d, and the rentals on sector specic capital are determined by by
independent set of conditions (16) and (17).
Such an independence is useful for tracing the e¤ects of changes in di¤erent
parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. We have following expression for the
1e (d) 1 = R1d  1g()d1 G(d)
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price of the variety produced by rm with average productivity, e:
p
e = 1
eF1 (L1; K1)
where F (L;K) is Cobb-Douglas production function2.
The more productive rms operate within sector, 1, the lower the price set
by rm with average productivity. Also, the productivity of the labor employed
within sector 1 inuences the price level. The higher the productivity of labor,
F1 (L1; K1), the lower prices become. Since labor is numeraire, scarce labor leads
to lower relative commodity prices.
According to relationship (9), Me is proportional to M . So, the xed entry
cost paid by entering rms is proportional to Mc1. Since variable and xed
production costs are proportional toMc1, the total cost paid by rms per period
is proportional toMc1. So,M is proportional to the output, F (L1; K1), resulting
from employment of all available factors within an sector:
M =
" e
d
#1 
F (L1; K1)
f
.
Since price index increases in average price and decreases in the mass of rms
in the market, the increase in sector-specic capital reduces the average price as
well as increases the mass of rms leading to the decrease in sectors price index.
On other side, the e¤ect of the increase in labor is not unambiguous. The mass of
rms increases with labor endowment. But the average price decreases as labor
becomes less productive. The rst e¤ect dominates if elasticity is su¢ ciently
2F (x; y) = x
1y1 1

1
1 [1 1]1 1
, F1 (x; y) =
@F (x;y)
@x and F2 (x; y) =
@F (x;y)
@y
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small:
P = [f ]
1
 1
d
1
[F (L1;K1)]
1
 1 F1(L1;K1)
.
Free trade
Under a free trade regime, both xed cost, fx, and variable trade costs,
 1   1, in sector 1 are zero. The trade cost in sector 2,  2   1, is also zero
in free trade. While receiving positive variable prot abroad and not paying
xed exporting cost, every rm attains an increase in prot with transition from
selling domestically to selling in both markets. As result, every active rm will
export: zero-prot productivity cuto¤ is equal to exporting productivity cuto¤
(di = xi). The fact that zero prot productivity cuto¤, di, and exporting
productivity cuto¤, xi, are equal leads to the same free entry condition (16)
as in the autarky case. Since cost parameters, f , fe, and the distribution of
productivity, g (), are assumed to be the same across countries, the zero-prot
productivity cuto¤s are the same across countries within a sector 1 ( di = dk =
d and ei = ek = e ). Due to the fact that all active rms export and set prices
domestically and abroad at the same level, we have the equality of price indexes
across countries3. The condition for zero-prot productivity, di, changes to:
Ri (di) =

diP
ci1
 1
I = fci1,
where I = Ii + Ik. We can conclude that ci1

 1

di
is equal across countries within
3Pil = Pkl = Pl =
"
Mil

w
l
i r
1 l
il

1  e 1il +Mkl wlk r1 lkl 1  e 1kl
# 1
1 
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sector, 1. This leads to the equality of unit costs in sector 1. According to the
condition (11) , in free trade we have the equality of the unit costs in sector 2.
So, for both sectors, we have
cil = ckl. (18)
The equality of unit costs (expression (18)), the goods market clearing con-
dition (expression (14)), the relation between the expenditure on labor and on
sector-specic capital, wiLil =
l
1 l rilKil, and labor market clearing condition
(expression (10)) lead to the determination of factor prices.
Any equilibrium can be referenced by di with i = 1; 2 and fwi, rilg with
i; l = 1; 2. il, wi, ril lead to the determination of Ri () and i () as well as
their average values. The allocation of labor across sectors is determined by
wiLil =
l
1 l rilKil. The mass of rms (Mi) is determine as the ratio of total
revenue collected by rms within sector to the average revenue of rms in this
sector. Finally, price indexes can be found from information on the mass of rms
and commodity prices pi
ei.
Proposition 1 A unique free trade equilibrium, referenced by {wi, ril, di}
with i; l = 1; 2 exists.
To focus on the changes in Country 1 with transition from autarky to free
trade, we normalize w1 = 1. If all labor in Country i moved to sector l, then
its productivity would be equal to aLil = l
h
Kil
Li
i1 l
. Then, a
L
i1
aLi2
shows how labor
would be more productive in sector 1 relatively to sector 2. At the same time
aLi1
aLi2
is the indicator of comparative advantage. If a
L
21
aL22
<
aL11
aL12
, then Country 1 has a
comparative advantage in sector 1, while Country 2 has a comparative advantage
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in sector 2.4
Proposition 2 With identical factor intensities in entry, production and ex-
porting, in transition from autarky to free trade: (a) The zero-prot productivity
cuto¤ and average industry productivity stay the same. (b) The rental on capital
relative to wage rate in the countrys comparative advantage sector increases.
(c) The rental on capital relative to wage rate in the countrys comparative dis-
advantage sector decreases. (d) Labor reallocates to the countrys comparative
advantage sector. (e) The mass of rms increases in sector 1, if it is compara-
tive advantage sector and decreases if it is comparative disadvantage sector. (f)
The number of available for consumption varieties in sector 1 increases.
In addition to the e¤ect of trade liberalization within traditional approach, we
have the positive e¤ect of the increase in variety on the welfare of owners of any
factor, that is specic to outlined framework. Changes in average productivity
of rms might have had the e¤ect on welfare of the owners of factors, but in
transition from autarky to free trade the average productivity of rms stays the
same.
Costly trade
We will start with the analysis of the modied model. In the modied frame-
work, there are only xed factors of production (sector specic capital) and the
model does not have mobile factor (labor). The modied model is the case of
4When a country has a comparative advantage in some sector, it is a net exporter in this
sector.
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outlined framework with 1 = 0 and 2 = 0. We could get more explicit de-
scription of the mechanism of the e¤ect of trade liberalization in sector 2 on the
average productivity of the rms in each country within sector 1. With this mod-
ication, the unit cost includes only the cost of sector specic capital cil = ril.
At the same time, the return to the sector specic capital employed in the sector
l of country i is equal to Iil = rilKil and the aggregate income of the residents
in country i is equal to Ii =
X
l
rilKil.
This section considers positive xed trade cost fx and variable trade cost
 1   1. We are going to analyze the e¤ect of the decrease in variable trade
cost,  2, on economic variables. We have the following existence result for the
equilibrium dened by conditions outlined in section "Overall equilibrium".
First notice that expression (8) describes the relationship between zero-prot
productivity cuto¤, di, and exporting productivity cuto¤, xi, in sector 1 of
country i. Similar to Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, comparison of expression
(16) and expression (8) leads to the conclusion that, with transition from autarky
to costly trade, di increases. The possibility of exporting makes market entrance
more appealing and leads to the increase in the number of rms there. The
increased competition between rms pushes up di.
From the expression (8), the inequality for the percentage changes of the
cuto¤s, bdi and bxi, within sector 1 of country i can be derived 5:
5
i =
fx
1Z
xi
h

xi
i 1
g()d
f
1Z
di
h

di
i 1
g()d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 
bdibxi = i < 1 (19)
This implies a smaller percentage drop in bdi in response to the percentage
increase in bxi for the case of fx < f . Fixed cost of entry equals to the sum
of the expected prot collected domestically and the increase in expected prot,
that comes with exporting, according to the expression (8). As result, the in-
crease in one component should be compensated by the decrease in the other
one. It could be shown that the expected prot collected domestically and the
increase in expected prot, that comes with exporting, are less responsive to the
changes in corresponding productivity cuto¤ for larger values of this cuto¤. In
the equilibrium of interest zero-prot productivity cuto¤ is smaller than export-
ing productivity cuto¤ (di < xi). So, the expected prot collected domestically
decreases more in response to the percentage increase in bdi, than the increase
in expected prot, that comes with the exporting, goes up in the response to
the equivalent decrease in bxi. For the change in the expected prot collected
domestically to be equal to the the change in the increase in expected prot from
exporting with opposite sign, we should have bdi <  bxi.
At the same time, the condition (13) could be rewritten in percentage changes
as bx1   bd1 = bd2   bx2. (20)
When we choose the specic value for productivity cuto¤ d1, the levels of all
other productivity cuto¤s are uniquely identied. In other words, the changes in
other cuto¤s could be tracked through the changes in d1. Taking into account
that zero-prot productivity cuto¤ and exporting productivity cuto¤ move in
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opposite directions, the left side of the above expression is negative, when d1
increases. For the right side to be negative, x2 needs to increase. So, x2
increases in the response to the increase in d1.
The degree of the response of x2 to the increase in d1 determines the e¤ect
of the increase in d1 on the ratio of returns to capital across countries,
r21
r11
, when,
instead, we consider the rms selling on country 1 market within sector 1 while
deriving the expression (12). We have:
cr21
r11
=
   1

hbx2   bd1i . (21)
The inequality (19) for the percentage changes in cuto¤ in every country
and the expression (20) connecting the cuto¤s across countries can be used to
compare bx2 and bd1. The percentage decrease in x1, caused by the increase
in d1, is larger than the percentage increase in d1. At the same time, the
percentage decrease in d2, caused by the increase in x2, is smaller than the
percentage increase in d2. For the left part of expression (20) to be equal to
the right side, bx2 should be larger than bd1. So, with the increase in d1, r21r11
increases.
Notice that the revenue of the rms in sector l of country i, Iil, is equal to
the return to the sector specic capital employed in this sector, Iil = rilKil. As
result, the ratio, I2l
I1l
, of the revenue of the rms in sector l of country, 2, to the
revenue of the rms in sector l of country 1 is equal to the ratio of the returns
to the sector capital across countries within sector l, I2l
I1l
= r2l
r1l
K2l
K1l
. For the sector
1, since r21
r11
increases in d1, the ratio,
I21
I11
, of the revenue of rms in country, 2,
to the revenue of rms in country, 1, within sector, 1, increases in the zero-prot
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productivity cuto¤, d1.
According to the section "Overall equilibrium", the ratio of the revenue col-
lected domestically to the total revenue collected domestically and abroad by
rms within sector, 1, of country, i, is equal to i =
Rdi
Ri
. Where Rdi is the
average revenue collected from the domestic market and Ri = Rdi + {iRxi with
Rxi being the average revenue collected from abroad. We could rewrite i as:
i =
[1 G (di)]Rdi
[1 G (di)]Rdi + [1 G (xi)]Rxi
. (22)
This representation of i could be interpreted as the ratio of the expected
revenue collected on the domestic market to the sum of the expected revenue
collected domestically and the expected revenue collected abroad by rms
within sector, 1, of country, i. Using arguments similar to the arguments in
the section "Equilibrium in a di¤erentiated product sector", we can demonstrate
that the expected revenue collected domestically, [1 G (di)]Rdi, decreases in
zero-prot productivity cuto¤, di, and the expected revenue collected abroad,
[1 G (xi)]Rxi, decreases in exporting productivity cuto¤, xi.
With the increase in the zero-prot productivity cuto¤, di, the exporting pro-
ductivity cuto¤, xi, decreases. Correspondingly, the expected revenue collected
on the foreign market increases and the expected revenue collected domestically
decreases. As result, the share of the revenue collected domestically in the total
revenue collected by rms in sector 1 of country i decreases with the increase in
the zero-prot productivity cuto¤, di.
We have established the e¤ect of the changes in d1 on the ratio,
I21
I11
, of the
revenue of the rms across counties in sector 1. Also, we found the e¤ect of the
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changes in di on the share of domestically collected revenue in the total revenue
of rms within sector 1 of each country, i. Given the established properties, we
can analyze the e¤ect of the decrease in trade cost in sector 2 on the economic
variables of interest. Goods market clearing condition (14) corresponding to the
expenditures of both countries on sector 1 commodity (l = 1) and expression (15)
corresponding to the expenditures of country 1 on sector 1 commodity (i = 1)
play the important role in the analysis.
We start with the analysis of the case, when country 1 has the comparative
advantage in sector 2. For normalization, we assume that r12 = 1. Before the
decrease in sector 2 trade cost,  2, we had for the commodity prices in sector 2:
p22 =  2p12. When  2 decreases, rms in sector 2 exporting their products from
country 1 to country 2 can undercut the commodity price in country 2 and make
the positive prot at the same time. Facing the increased competition, rms in
sector 2 and country 2 start lower their prices. Before  2 has been decreased,
p22 = r22. With the decrease in p22 rms in sector 2 of country 2 will be making
negative prot and some of them will leave the market. As result, the demand for
sector specic capital in sector 2 of country 2 decreases, leading to the decrease
in r22 till r22 will be equal to the new value of  2.
Though the described changes occurred in sector 2, these changes will e¤ect
sector 1. With the decrease in r22, the income of the owners of sector specic
capital in sector 2, I22 = r22K22, decreases. This leads to the decrease in overall
income of the residents in country 2, I2. As result, the residents in country
2 will spend less on sector 1 commodity. Since residents in country 2 spend
less on sector 1 commodity, rms exporting from country 1 to country 2 collect
less revenue. The return to the sector-specic capital in sector 1 of country 1
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decreases. We could note right away that with r12 being numeraire, I11I12 decreases.
Moreover, later having less income, the residents in country 1 will be spending
less on sector 1 commodity leading to I11
I12
being smaller in resulted equilibrium
than in the initial equilibrium. In other words the decrease in I11
I12
is the result of
the decrease in  2 and goods market clearing condition (14)6.
Smaller demand for sector 1 commodity from the residents in country 2 leads
to more intense competition on country 2 market. The least productive rms
in sector 1 of country 2, that sell domestically only, will be forced to leave mar-
ket. As result, zero-prot productivity cuto¤, d2, in country 2 increases. And
overall number of rms, M2, based in country 2 decreases. With more intense
competition, the exporting productivity cuto¤, x1, for the rms exporting their
products from country 1 to country 2 market will increase.
Now, lets analyze the market of country 1. On the left side of the expression
(15) we have the expenditures by residents of country 1 on the sector 1 commod-
ity. And on the right side, we have the revenues of the rms toward which these
expenditures went. With the assumption that I21 decreases in such a way that
I21
I11
in the nal equilibrium is the same as in the initial leads to the violation of
the condition (15). In this case, the expenditures of country 1 on sector 1 exceed
the revenue of the rms collected on this market. Notice that if the violation did
not occur, than there would not exist the pressure for d1 (and all other cuto¤) to
change according to the expression (21). Since expenditures exceed revenues of
the rms collected on this market, there is an opportunity for new entrants with
6
I12
I11
increases as I22I12 decreases in modied goods market clearing condition:
I12
I11
= 1 
1+
I21
I11
1+
I22
I12
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realized productivity that is smaller than the productivity of the active rms on
the market to enter and collect positive prot on domestic market. This will
cause zero-prot productivity cuto¤, d1, to decrease. Moreover, because of the
disbalance of expenditures and rms revenue on this market, less productive
rms from country 2 will nd protable to export their products from country
2 to country 1.
Summarizing, we have established that d1 decreases and x1 increases, while
d2 increases and x2 decreases. We could see that with such changes in cuto¤s,
the ratio, 1, of the domestically collected revenue to the total revenue of the
rms in country 1 increase. Also, the ratio, 1   2, of the revenue collected
abroad to the total revenue of rms in country 2 increase. These changes lead to
the increase in the revenue collected by rms selling on country 1 market (the
increase in the right side of the condition (15)). At the same time the ratio, I21
I11
,
decreases with the adjustment of productivity cuto¤ to nal equilibrium values.
We have described the mechanism of the spillover e¤ect of the trade liberal-
ization in sector 2 in the specic factors model without mobile factor. Similar
mechanism works in the case of the specic factors model with mobile factor
(labor). First, we have the following existence result for the equilibrium dened
by conditions outlined in section "Overall equilibrium".
Proposition 3 A unique costly trade equilibrium, referenced by variables: {wi,
ril,di, xi} with i; l = 1; 2 exists.
The case where comparative advantage is driven by interaction between the
endowments of sector specic capital, endowment labor and factor intensities
across sectors (as specied in section "Free trade") is considered.
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Proposition 4 Following conditions hold:
1. f , fx and fe are assumed to be the same across countries with fx < f
2. There exists   1
2
and 1  , and 2  1
A decrease in sector 2 trade cost leads to: (a) an increase in sector 1 exporting
productivity cuto¤ (the decrease in zero-prot productivity cuto¤ ) and a decrease
in w2
w1
, if sector 1 is of comparative disadvantage; (b) a decrease in sector 1
exporting productivity cuto¤ (the increase in zero-prot productivity cuto¤ ) and
an increase in w2
w1
, if sector 1 is of comparative advantage; (c) an increase in
the rental on capital relative to wage rate in comparative advantage sector and
decrease in the rental on capital relative to wage rate in comparative disadvantage
sector; and (d) labor moves from the comparative disadvantage sector to the
comparative advantage sector.
The results about the spillover e¤ects of trade liberalization trade are unique
and add value to the existing literature. Melitz, 2003, framework has hetero-
geneous rms with monopolistic competition market structure. At the same
time, Melitz, 2003, framework is one sector model, which precludes us from
exploring the spillover e¤ects of trade liberalization in one sector on economic
variable of interest in the other sector. Our framework allows for the analysis
of spillover e¤ects. Moreover, the above stated result provides the determinants
of the spillover e¤ect. From countrys point of view, the sign of spillover e¤ect
of trade liberalization in sector 2 on the zero-prot productivity cuto¤ and ex-
porting productivity cuto¤ in sector 1 depends on sector 1 being of comparative
advantage or of comparative disadvantage for this country. We would like es-
pecially to point out that the model framework in Bernard, Redding, & Schott,
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2007, has two sectors, the type of trade liberalization they considered is the one
of the transition from autarky to costly trade. While we analyze the e¤ect of the
decrease in trade cost, while countries experience costly trade.
At the same time, the predictions about the changes in the rental on capital
relative to the wage rage across sectors within country are consistent with the
predictions generated by the sector specic factors model with perfect compe-
tition market structure in both sectors. This is very instructive, since we have
shown that the predictions of somewhat simpler model about the changes in re-
turn on sector specic capital are still valid in more sophisticated framework with
explicitly introduced rms. Here, we would like to point out that the discovered
spillover e¤ects correspond to the case when the trade liberalization occurred in
the sector with perfecto competition market structure.
Conclusion
This chapter studies the e¤ects of trade policies in the specic-factors model
with homogeneous good and constant returns to scale in one sector and het-
erogeneity of rms and production di¤erentiation in the other sector. The rich
structure of the model allows the opportunity to analyze the e¤ect of the reduc-
tion in trade cost as well as transition from autarky to costly trade on the lowest
productivity among active rms as well as on the lowest productivity among the
exporting rms in countrys sector with di¤erentiated product. The framework
allows identifying how the e¤ect of trade polices could depend on comparative
advantage that is driven by interaction of the di¤erence in the intensity of labor
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usage across sectors with the distribution of capital across countries and sectors
as well as the distribution of labor across countries.
Falling trade costs lead to the reallocation of resources both within and across
industries, changes in average productivity of rms, and changes in factor prices.
The response of average productivity of rms within a countrys sector with
di¤erentiated commodity to the reduction of trade cost in countrys sector with
homogeneous commodity is sector-dependent. The average productivity of rms
in countrys sector with di¤erentiated commodity in response to the decrease
in the trade cost in sector with homogeneous commodity decreases, if, in this
sector country has comparative disadvantage. Or, equivalently, the zero prot
productivity cuto¤ decrease. So that the rms with productivity lower than the
lowest productivity of rms before the trade liberalization will enter and stay on
the market. At the same time, the exporting productivity cuto¤ increases. The
rms with relatively low productivities will exit market after trade liberalization
in this case. Conversely, the average productivity of rms in countrys sector with
di¤erentiated commodity increases, if country has comparative advantage in this
sector. Naturally, the rental on capital to wage rate increases in the comparative
advantage sector, and decreases in comparative disadvantage sector, and labor
partially moves to comparative advantage sector.
This result leads to certain predictions about the e¤ect of trade liberalization
in agricultural sector on other sectors that produce di¤erentiated products. This
e¤ect could be negative in a sense that less productive rms will need to exit. Or
this e¤ect could be positive in a sense that less productive rms could successfully
enter the market. Undoubtedly, policy makers should take into account these
spillover e¤ects.
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CHAPTER II
TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS
Introduction
In this chapter we continue to seek the answers to the questions how trade
liberalization inuences the distribution of rms over three dimensions: produc-
tivity, size (amounts of employed factors), and collected revenue/prot. And, we
look at the spillover e¤ects of trade liberalization in one sector on the average
productivity of rms in the other sector. Though this time, we modify the tra-
ditional specic factors model by introducing monopolistic competition market
structure with heterogeneous rms into both sectors. This allows us to study
how the trade liberalization in the sector with heterogeneous rms and product
di¤erentiation will a¤ect the other sector with heterogeneous rms and product
di¤erentiation. In other words, how trade liberalization in textile sector a¤ects
rms in apparel sector.
We analyze the possibility that the results, we have received in Chapter 1,
might change. The reason for this is that the trade liberalization in particular
sector a¤ects the average productivity of rms in this sector. The change in
average productivity of rm could a¤ect how the trade liberalization inuences
the average productivity of rms in the other sector through the spillover e¤ect.
Moreover, the model setup allows us to explore the e¤ect of trade liberalization
in particular sector on the rms within the same sector in the presence of other
sector. This is not possible in Melitz, 2003, since this is one sector model.
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This study di¤ers fromMelitz, 2003, since we have two sectors with rms that
are heterogeneous with respect to productivity. And every rm within sector
produces distinct variety of sectors commodity. Having two sectors instead of
one allows us to study the e¤ect of trade liberalization in one sector on average
productivity of rms in the other sector.
This study di¤ers from Krugman, 1981, since rm are heterogeneous with
respect to productivity. Having rms heterogeneous with respect to productiv-
ity leads to selfselection of rms into non-exporters and exporters. Those rms
with productivities above "zero prot productivity cuto¤" but below "export-
ing productivity cuto¤" server the domestic market only. While the rms with
productivities above "exporting productivity cuto¤" serve both domestic mar-
ket and foreign market. Trade liberalization leads to the changes in zero prot
productivity cuto¤and "exporting productivity cuto¤". Respectively, the aver-
age productivity of rms exporting abroad and at least serving domestic market
changes with trade liberalization.
Further, we will outline the model setup, state the results and provide the
intuition.
Preferences, endowment structure and production structure
As in Chapter I, for the analysis of trade liberalization, we use a two country,
two sector model with endowment structure similar to that of the specic factors
model. Country i has Li endowment of labor and Kil endowment of sector l type
capital.
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Many varieties of commodity are produced within every sector l. So, within
every sector, commodity is di¤erentiated. The CES utility function represents
preferences over a continuum (large number) of varieties within every sector.
Preferences for all available varieties combine the preferences for varieties within
each sector via Cobb-Douglas function, so that the share of income spent on the
varieties produced within a particular sector is constant. The utility function of
a representative consumer is:
Ui = 
l
"Z
j2
il
qil (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
#l
, (23)
where qil (j) denotes the consumption of variety, j, produced in sector, l,
by the representative consumer in country, i. 
il is the set of all available to
consumer varieties within industry, l. l corresponds to the portion of total
expenditures that goes toward the varieties in industry l (1 = ). As result,
demand for variety qil (j) is of the same form as in expression (2).
The production structure of sector l is similar to the production structure
of sector 1 in Chapter I. Though, the xed cost of entry, fel, the xed cost of
production, fl, the xed cost of exporting, fxl, and the variable trade cost,  l 1,
are sector specic. The equilibrium in particular sector l is specied by conditions
that are similar to the conditions in subsection "Equilibrium in a di¤erentiated
product sector" of Chapter I. The notations for zero prot productivity cuto¤
and exporting productivity cuto¤ change to dil and xil.
Overall equilibrium
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The same labor market clearing condition (10) requires that the total demand
for labor from both sectors being equal to it exogenous supply. At the same time,
instead of condition (11) for the ratio of unit costs in sector 2, we have condition
c22
c12
=
h
d22
x12
i 1

h
fx2
f2
i 1


 1

2 , (24)
which is similar to the condition for the ratio of unit costs in sector 1, ex-
pression (12). We have conditions connecting cuto¤s across countries for every
sector, which is similar to the condition (13). Finally, in addition to the goods
market clearing condition (14), we have two conditions stating the equivalence
between the expenditures of country 1 on every sector and revenues of the rms
toward which these expenditures go.
lI1 = 1lI1l + [1  2l] I2l. (25)
where l = 1; 2. For the purposes of further analysis we can write down goods
market clearing condition in the following form:
I12
I11
=
1  

1 + I21
I11
1 + I22
I12
. (26)
Welfare implications of transition from autarky to free trade
In addition to the e¤ect of trade liberalization within traditional approach, we
have the positive e¤ect of the increase in variety on the welfare of owners of any
factor, that is specic to outlined framework. Changes in average productivity of
rms and in the number of rms on the market a¤ect the welfare of the owners
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of factors of production. Since, in transition from autarky to free trade, the
average productivity of rms stays the same, the change in the number of rms
will only play role.
When the rental on capital relative to wage rate in the countrys compara-
tive advantage sector increases, the price of every variety in this sector relative to
wage rate increases by smaller amount. So, the owners of capital in comparative
advantage sector are able to buy larger amount of every variety produced within
this sector. Also, they are be able to buy larger amount of every variety pro-
duced within comparative disadvantage sector, since the price of every variety
there relative to wage rate decreases. In addition, the owners of capital have an
opportunity to buy imported varieties. So they are undoubtedly better o¤.
At the same time, the rental on capital relative to wage rate in the countrys
comparative disadvantage sector decreases. The price of every variety in this
sector relative to wage rate decreases by smaller amount. So, the owners of the
capital in comparative disadvantage sector are able to buy the smaller amount
of every variety produced within this sector. Also, they are able to buy smaller
amount of every variety produced within comparative advantage sector, as price
of every variety there relative to wage rate increases. In this sense, expectably
they are worse o¤. But, the increase in the number of available varieties, which
comes with trade liberalization, leads to the potential improvement in their wel-
fare. Notice, we have following expression for welfare of the owner of capital,
Ui =
ril
Pi1P
1 
i2
, and for price index, P1l =
r
1 l
1l
e1l M
1
1 
l . The positive e¤ect of the
increase in the number of available varieties is bigger, when  is smaller. So, we
have following result:
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Proposition 5 A value of demand elasticity  exists, such that for any  < ,
the owner of any factor will gain from trade liberalization (autarky to free trade).
At the same time, for su¢ ciently high  > , the owner of capital in compar-
ative advantage sector is better o¤, while the owner of capital in comparative
disadvantage sector is worse o¤ in the course of transition from autarky to free
trade.
This result could be related to the similar one in Krugman, 1981. Krugman,
1981, has studied the welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization in the two countries,
two sectors model with sector specic factors and monopolistic competition mar-
ket structure in both sectors. Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2007, demonstrated
that in the model with monopolistic competition market structure and heteroge-
neous rms under constant elasticity of demand, zero-prot productivity cuto¤
does not change in transition from autarky to free trade. So, basically, in the
transition from autarky to free trade, we do not have productivity e¤ect but only
variety e¤ect as in Krugman, 1981. Only in addition to specic factors, we have
mobile factor (labor). When  is su¢ ciently small, the variety e¤ect dominate
the decrease in the return to capital in comparative disadvantage sector. And the
owners of capital in comparative disadvantage sector are better o¤ in transition
from autarky to free trade. At the same time, we would like to mention that
in the two countries, two sectors factor specic model with perfect competition
market structure, labor is better o¤ from transition from autarky to free trade.
(This is might not always be true in the standard specic factors model of open
economy.) Since the labor is better o¤ in the model with perfect competition
market structure, we receive the improvement in welfare of labor when there
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exist the variety e¤ect.
Costly trade
An idea of the e¤ect of changes in variable trade cost on the average produc-
tivity of rms within each countrys sector (or on productivity cuto¤s) becomes
apparent from examining how the expenditures of Country 1 on each sector are
allocated across domestic and foreign rms:


1 +
I12
I11

= 11 + [1  21]
I21
I11
(27)
[1  ]

1 +
I11
I12

= 12 + [1  22]
I22
I12
. (28)
We can substitute the expression for I12
I11
from the condition (26) into the
conditions (27) and (28). Then, these conditions will include the ratio of domes-
tically collected revenue to the total revenue of rms in sector l of country i, il
with i; l = 1; 2, for both countries and both sectors and the ratio of the revenue
of the rms in country 2 and the revenue of the rms in country 1 within every
sector, I2l
I1l
with l = 1; 2.
We know that by tracking the changes in x1l, the changes in all other cuto¤s
within sector l can be established. Moreover, we know how the changes in xil
inuence il and how the changes in x1l inuence
I2l
I1l
. By tracking only the
changes in x1l, we know how il,
I2l
I1l
and [1  2l] I2lI1l will be a¤ected. So, we
could concentrate on the equilibrium values of x11 and x12 only.
Before conducting the analysis of the e¤ect of changes in parameters on pro-
ductivity cuto¤s, the mechanisms determining x11 and x12 should be explored.
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For equilibrium value of the ratio of wages across countries, w1
w2
, the equilibrium
values of x11 and x12 can be found from conditions (27) and (28).
With the increase in x11, the right side of the expression (27) increases. The
resulted decrease in I21
I11
causes the decrease in I12
I11
, according to condition (26).
x12 should increase to restore the equality in expression (27). Moreover, the
increase in x12 should be such that the increase in
I21
I11
resulted from the increase
in x12 is larger than the initial decrease in
I21
I11
resulted from the initial increase
in x11.
With the increase in x11, the right side of the expression (28) does not
change. So, the increase in I21
I11
resulted from the increase in x12 should be equal
to the decrease in I21
I11
caused by the initial increase in x11. We can conclude that
the increase in x12 in response to the increase in x11 is larger for condition (27)
than for condition (28). So, the curve 1x12 (x11; w), corresponding to condition
1, is steeper than the curve 2x12 (x11; w), corresponding to condition 2 (Figure
3 and Figure 4).
In this subsection, we undertake the detailed analysis of the case, when coun-
tries are equally endowed with labor. And the structure of capital endowments
is:
K11 = K21
K12 = K22
,
where  > 1. In addition, we require the total endowment of capital be the same
across countries: K11 + K12 = K21 + K22 and  = 12 . Then country 1 has the
comparative advantage in sector 1 and comparative disadvantage in sector 2.
Proposition 6 Assuming that l,  l, fl, fxl and fel are the same across sectors
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with fxl < fl, the decrease in sectors variable trade cost leads to: (a) a decrease
in this sectors exporting productivity cuto¤ (and to the increase in this sector
zero-prot productivity cuto¤ ); (b) an increase in the other sectors exporting
productivity cuto¤ (and to the decrease in zero-prot productivity cuto¤ in the
other sector) if variable trade cost decreases in comparative advantage sector;
(c) the decrease in the other sectors exporting productivity cuto¤ (and to the
increase in zero-prot productivity cuto¤ in the other sector) if variable trade
cost decreases in comparative disadvantage sector; (d) the increase in the rental
on capital relative to wage rate in comparative advantage sector and decrease
in the rental on capital relative to wage rate in comparative disadvantage sector;
and (e) labor moves from the comparative disadvantage sector to the comparative
advantage sector.
This result, though derived under somewhat strong assumptions, demon-
strates that we have the spillover e¤ect of trade liberalization as stated in Chap-
ter 1 in the modied framework with monopolistic competition market structure
and heterogeneous rms. It is interesting that the properties of the spillover e¤ect
are similar to the properties of the spillover e¤ect outlined in Chapter I, when the
market structure di¤ers across sectors. Primarily, the sign of the spillover e¤ect
depends on comparative advantage structure of the model. Bernard, Redding,
& Schott, 2007, had the framework with monopolistic competition market struc-
ture and heterogeneous rms in both sectors, while assuming that the factors of
production are mobile. Also, they assumed that the xed production cost, xed
exporting cost and variable trade cost are the same across sectors. They have
found many properties corresponding to the trade liberalization, when countries
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go from autarky to free trade. In our analysis, we analyzed the e¤ect of the re-
duction in trade cost, while countries already experience costly trade. We would
like to stress that this is more realistic case, since there are no so many coun-
tries that recently experienced the transition from autarky to free trade. Also,
while having for the monopolistic competition market structure in both sectors,
we allowing for the change in productivity in the sector where the reduction in
trade costs occurs. This possibility was ruled out in Chapter I, because of perfect
competition market structure.
Finally, we have established that the average productivity of rms in the
sector, where trade costs decreased, increases. This result stands in agreement
with Melitz, 2003, one sector framework. So, Melitz, 2003, result about the
e¤ect of trade liberalization on the same sector productivity still stays true in
the model with several sectors.
We would like to start with the description of mechanism behind the e¤ects of
trade liberalization. The new values of x11 and x12 are close to those attained
from analysis of expressions (27) and (28) together with the expression (14),
holding wi
wk
xed. And, the directions of changes in x11 and x12 are the same
as the directions of changes in x11 and x12 in the case with no adjustment in
the ratio wage across countries.
Lets analyze the e¤ects of the decrease in  1 on economys variable, assuming
x11 stays xed. The shifts of the curves 
1
x12 (x11; w) and 
2
x12 (x11; w) for xed
x11 resulted from the decrease in  1, determine new x11 and x12. To determine
these shifts, we should identify the e¤ects of the decrease in  1 on the ratio, 21,
of domestically collected revenue to the total revenue of rms in Country 2 and
sector 1, and on ratio, I21
I11
, of revenues of rms across countries within sector
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1. Notice, that the decrease in  1 does not a¤ect the ratio, 11, of domestically
collected revenue to the total revenue of rms in Country 1 and sector 1, because
by xing x11, d11 will also be xed, according to the expression (8).
The decrease in  1 leads to the increase in the prot of the rms in sector 1
exporting their output from country 2 to country 1. As result, less productive
rms would be able to export their output from country 2 to country 1, what
causes the decrease in x21. With the decrease in x21, d21 increases according
to the condition (8). The decrease in  1 dominates the increase in d21 leading
to the decrease in I21
I11
with the decrease in  1. With the decrease in x21 and
the increase in d21, the ratio, 21, increases. Finally, the increase in 1   21
dominates the decrease in I21
I11
, so that [1  21] I21I11 increases with the decrease in
 1.
With the decrease in  1, the right side of the expression (27) increases, since
[1  21] I21I11 increases. The resulted decrease in I21I11 causes the decrease in I12I11 ,
according to goods market clearing condition (26). x12 should increase to restore
the equality in expression (27). Moreover, the increase in x12 should be such
that the increase in I21
I11
resulted from the increase in x12 is larger than the initial
decrease in I21
I11
caused by the initial decrease in  1.
With the decrease in  1, the right side of the expression (28) does not change.
So, the increase in I21
I11
resulted from the increase in x12 should be equal to the
decrease in I21
I11
caused by the initial increase in x11. We can conclude that the
increase in x12 in response to the decrease in  1 is larger for condition (27) than
for condition (28). So, the curve 1x12 (x11; w), corresponding to condition 1,
shifts more than the curve 2x12 (x11; w), corresponding to condition 2. This im-
plies the decrease in the exporting productivity cuto¤ in sector 1, x11. As result,
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Figure 3: Change in cuto¤s, when country 1 has relatively more of Sector 1 -
type capital
zero-prot productivity cuto¤ in sector 1, x11, and the average productivity of
rms there increase (Figure 3 and Figure 4) in the response to the decrease in
variable trade cost in the same sector.
Notice, the responsiveness of x12 to the increase in x11 is primarily deter-
mined by goods market condition (26).
I12
I11
=
1  

1 + r21
r11
K21
K11
1 + r22
r12
K22
K12
When Country 1 is has a comparative advantage in sector 1 (K21
K11
is smaller
than K22
K12
), then to compensate the increase in x11 on
I12
I11
, x12 should adjust by
a small amount. In this case, curves are gradual (Figure 3). In the case K21
K11
is
larger than K22
K12
, x12 should adjust considerably in response to the increase in
x11 and curves are steep (Figure 4).
Since, we have identied the shifts in curves in response to the reduction in
 1, the analysis of how the cuto¤s productivities respond to the decrease in  1
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Figure 4: Change in cuto¤s, when country 1 has relatively more of sector 2 -
type capital
could be conducted. If the decrease in  1 caused the shift in curve 
2
x12 (x11; w)
only, then x11 and x12 would increase (according to Figure 4 or Figure 5, ).
On other hand, if the decrease in  1 caused the shift in 
1
x12 (x11; w) only, then
x11 and x12 would decrease.
The resulting e¤ect on x11 is negative, because the shift in curve 
1
x12 (x11; w)
is larger then the shift in curve 2x12 (x11; w). Only very large the shift in curve
1x12 (x11; w) could cause the decrease in x12, when Country 1 has comparative
in sector 1. So, x12 increases in this case (Figure 4). In this case, exporting
rms with relatively low productivity will exit exporting market after trade lib-
eralization in sector 2. Since d12 decreases, even the less productive rms than
the ones existed on the market before trade liberalization, will be able to sur-
vive on the domestic market. At the same time, the moderate shift in curve
1x12 (x11; w) is needed for x12 to decrease, when Country 1 has comparative in
sector 1. As a result, x12 decreases in this case (Figure 5). In this case, d12
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increases. The least productive rms will leave the domestic market and the
rms with productivity lower, than the productivity of exporting rms before
trade liberalization, will enter the exporting market successfully.
Conclusion
This chapter studies the e¤ects of trade policies in the specic-factors model
with heterogeneous rms and product di¤erentiation. The rich structure of the
model allows the opportunity to analyze the e¤ect of the reduction in variable
trade cost in particular sector on the lowest productivity among active rms as
well as on the lowest productivity among the exporting rms in both countrys
sectors. In addition, consideration includes the e¤ect on factor prices, price in-
dexes, and the number of rms across sectors. The framework allows identifying
how the e¤ect of trade polices could depend on di¤erences among sectors with
respect to endowments of sector-specic capital and other sector characteristics.
Falling trade costs lead to: reallocation of resources both within and across
industries, changes in average productivity of rms across sectors, and changes
in factor prices. In the two-country, specic-factors model, the e¤ect of the
reduction in a sectors variable trade cost on the average productivity of rms
in any one of two countries within this sector is positive.
The analysis of the case, when Country A has more capital in one sector than
Country B, and Country A has less capital than country B in another sector,
is conducted. In this case, the response of average productivity of rms within
Country As sector to the reduction of trade cost in the other sector is sector-
dependent. The average productivity of rms in Country As sector in response
43
to the decrease in variable trade cost in the other sector decreases, if, in this
sector, Country A has less capital than Country B. Conversely, the average pro-
ductivity of rms in Country As sector increases, if Country A has more capital
in this sector than country B. Naturally, independently of the sector, where the
variable trade cost decreased, the rental on capital to wage rate increases in the
sector where country has more capital relative to the other country, and decreases
in the other sector, and labor partially moves to the sector, where country has
more capital than another country.
This result leads to certain predictions about trade liberalization, when trade
costs in both sectors decrease. The average productivity of rms increases in
countrys sector, where the country has more capital, than the other country.
In this case, the e¤ect of the decrease in variable trade cost in other sector
on average productivity of rms in this sector is positive as is the e¤ect of the
reduction in trade cost in this sector. At the same time, the average productivity
of rms might increase or decrease in countrys sector, where the country has less
capital, than the other country. Because, the e¤ect of the decrease in variable
trade cost in other sector on average productivity of rms is negative, while the
e¤ect from the reduction in trade cost in this sector is positive. To test these
result, the empirical study should be conducted.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Since any equilibrium can be referenced by fwi, ril, dig with i; l =
1; 2, lets show that these variables are uniquely determined. di can be found
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uniquely from condition (16), in free trade regime di = d. The left side of this
expression is continuous and decreasing function of di. This will guarantee the
existence and the uniqueness of di.
The relations between the expenditure on labor and sector specic capitals
in both countries, the goods market clearing condition (14) and the equality of
unit costs lead to the following system of equations (we normalized the w1 to
unity):
L1 =
1
1 1 r11K11 +
2
1 2 r12K12
wL2 =
1
1 1 r21K21 +
2
1 2 r22K22
1 
1 1 [r11K11 + r21K21] =

1 2 [r12K12 + r22K22]
r11 = w
1
1 1 r21
r12 = w
2
1 2 r22
(29)
The expressions for r11 and r12 from the last two equations can be substi-
tuted into rst three equations. The resulting system will consist of three
equations with three unknowns. Assuming that in equilibrium K11K22w
2
2 1  
K12K21w
1
1 1 6= 0 holds (we will check this later), the rst two equations can
be solved for r21 and r22. Substitute the expressions for r21 and r22 into third
equation, we will get equation in w only.
1 
1
w
1
1 1 + 1
k1
w
1
1 1   l
k1
= 
2
w
2
1 2 + 1
k2
l
k2
 w
1
1 2
(30)
where l = L1
L2
, k1 = K11K21 and k2 =
K12
K22
. These variables indicate the abundance
of country 1 relative to country 2 with factors of production. The values of w that
bring the denominator of the left and right sides to zero are wl =
h
l
k1
i1 1
and
wr =
h
l
k2
i1 2
correspondingly. Since country 1 has the comparative advantage
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in sector 1, then wl < wr.
wrwl w
ght side
left side
right side
Figure 5: Determination of w
The left side of expression (30) is decreasing from innity to some nite value
on interval (wl; wr), while the right side of this expression is increasing from some
nite value to innity on this interval. As result, there is w 2 (wl; wr) that makes
left side equal to the right side. There is no other positive value of w that satises
equation (30).
Finally, lets check if condition K11K22w
2
2 1  K12K21w
1
1 1 6= 0 (or equiva-
lently k1w
1
1 1   k2w
2
1 2 6= 0 ) is satised. In equilibrium we will have w 11 1  
l
k1
> 0 and l
k2
 w 11 2 > 0. We can write down these conditions as k1w
1
1 1   l
w
>
0 and l
w
  k2w
2
1 2
2 > 0. So that we have k1w
1
1 1   k2w
2
1 2 > 0. It could be
shown that in this case country 1 will be net importer of sector 2 commodity.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It was demonstrated that the zero-prot productivity cuto¤ and average
industry productivity does not change as country moves from autarky to free
trade. Lets nd expressions for r11 and r12. We can substitute the expressions
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for r21 and r22 from the last two equations of the system (29) into the third
equation. And then, we can solve for r11 and r12 the rst equation and modied
third equation of that system.
r11 = r
a
1
1+[1 ]2
1+[1 ]2
1+ 1
k1
w
  1
1 1
1+ 1
k2
w
  2
1 2
r12 = r
a
2
1+[1 ]2
[1 ]2+1
1+ 1
k2
w
  2
1 2
1+ 1
k1
w
  1
1 1
(31)
From
h
l
k1
i1 1
<
h
l
k2
i1 2
, it follows that k1w
1
1 1   k2w
2
1 2 > 0 (see proof
of proposition 1). Or, equivalently, 1
k2
w
  2
1 2   1
k1
w
  1
1 1 > 0 . From the above
expressions for rentals on capital, we can see that r11 is increasing, while r12 is
decreasing with transition from autarky to free trade. Since L1l =
l
1 l r1lK1l,
then with transition to free trade labor will partially move to the comparative
advantage sector.
Since, in free trade, every rm sells on domestic market and on foreign market,
the expression for the mass of rms within countrys sector would be the same
as in case of autarky: Mi = 11 1
h
iei
i 1
r
1
i1 Ki1
f
. Given that the value of i in
free trade is the same as in autarky, changes in ri1 determine changes in Mi. As
result,M1 increases with transition to free trade, since country 1 has comparative
advantage in sector. If country 1 had comparative disadvantage in sector 1, then
M1 would have decreased.
The number of available varieties in sector 1 goes up, since M1 goes up
(country 1 has comparative advantage in sector 1). Lets consider the case, when
country 1 has comparative disadvantage in sector 1. The number of varieties
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produced in country 1, M1, decreases in this case.
But the number of available varieties might increase because of imports of
varieties from country 2. Lets check that the number of available varieties
within sector 1 goes up in this case. The number of available varieties pro-
duced by rms within sector 1 in free trade regime is Ma = M1 + M2 =
r
1
11K11
[1 1]f
h
1e1
i 1 
1 + 1
k1w
1
1 1

. This result follows from the fact that zero-prot
productivity cuto¤s and unit costs within industry are the same across countries.
So, we will have
M1
Ma
=
"
1
1+[1 ]2
1+ 1
k2
w
  2
1 2
1+ 1
k1
w
  1
1 1
+ [1 ]2
1+[1 ]2
#1
1"
1+ 1
k2
w
  2
1 2
#1 1241+ 1
k1w
1
1 1
351 1
As all of the factors are greater than unity, the number of varieties in sector
1, when country 1 has comparative disadvantage in sector 1, increases. So, the
number of available varieties in sector 1 increases independently if this is the
sector of comparative advantage or disadvantage.
Relation between cuto¤s within sector
We have two equations (8) corresponding to di¤erent countries but the same
sector 1. In addition, we have equation (13), that connects all cuto¤s within
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sector 1. Finally, we have
f

1Z
d1
h

d1
i 1
  1

g () d+ fx

1Z
x1
h

x1
i 1
  1

g () d = fe
f

1Z
d2
h

d2
i 1
  1

g () d+ fx

1Z
x2
h

x2
i 1
  1

g () d = fe
d1d2
x1x2
= 1
21
h
f
fx
i 2
 1
(32)
These equations connect cuto¤s within sector 1. As a system consists of three
equations and contains four unknown variables, we could idnetify three of four
variables. For this purpose, we will use x1 as parameter. First equation denes
relationship d1 (x1). d1 (x1) is decreasing and convex function in positive
ortant with lim
d1!0
x1 = 1 and lim
x1!0
d1 = 1. As result, for given x1, there
is always unique value of d1. Then, given x1 and d1, from third equation
we could nd the ratio d2
x2
= a. Finally, we could guarantee that increasing
linear function d2 = ax2 and decreasing function d2 (x2) corresponding to
the second equation, with lim
d2!0
x2 = 1 and lim
x2!0
d2 = 1, intersect at one
point.
The range for x1 to guaranty existence of exporters and non-
exporters in both countries
From the third equation of the system, we can conclude that the neces-
sary condition for existence of exporters and non-exporters in both countries
(d1
x1
< 1 and d2
x2
< 1) is 1
21
h
f
fx
i 2
 1
< 1. Assuming that this property holds,
lets show that for some range of x1 there rms are divided into exporters and
non-exporters in both countries within sector 1. As, d1 (x1) is decreasing func-
tion, then d1
x1
(x1) would also be the decreasing function with
d1
x1
(0) =1 and
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d1
x1
(1) = 0. So, there exists x1 such that d1x1 (x1) = 1. This is the case,
when barely there are non-exporters in the rst country. This condition and
1
21
h
f
fx
i 2
 1
< 1 imply existence of exporters and non-exporters in country 2, as
d2
x2
< 1 from the third equation. Together condition d1
x1
= 1 and rst equa-
tion determine 
x1
(the lowest x1, when there non-exporters and exporters in
both countries). As the ratio d1
x1
continues to decrease with increase in x1,
it would become equal to 1
21
h
f
fx
i 2
 1
< 1. This is the case, when barely there
are non-exporters in country 2, as d2
x2
= 1. Again, the rst equation together
with condition d1
x1
= 1
21
h
f
fx
i 2
 1
can be solved for x1. Finally, for any value
of x1 2
h

x1
; x1
i
, rms are divided into exporters and non-exporters within
sector 1 in both countries.
Connection betweenMi and cuto¤s (when there is no mobile factor)
In the case, when there is no mobile factor in the model, we have following
expression for Mi:
Mi =
r
l
il Kil
[1 l]wli 
1 G(di)
f
1Z
di
h

di
i 1
g()d+fx
1Z
xi
h

xi
i 1
g()d
Lets nd the complete di¤erential of this expression:
[1 l]wli 
r
l
il Kil
dMi =
1
G
h
f
G
  1 g (di) ddi + fxg(xi)dxiG i
where G = f
1Z
di
h

di
i 1
g () d+fx
1Z
xi
h

xi
i 1
g () d. Notice that f
G
< 1.
So, Mi decreases with increase in di (xi decreases in this case)
Connection between factor prices.
50
Similar to free trade case, the relations between the expenditure on labor and
sector specic capitals in both countries, the goods market clearing condition (14)
and the relations between sector unit costs across countries (12) can be combined
to the system of equations (we normalized the w1 to unity), in which rst three
equations would be exactly like in the system (29). While last two conditions
will modify to

d2
x1
h
fx
f
i 1
 1
 1
  1
[1 1]
r11 = w
1
1 1 r21

  1
1 2
2 r12 = w
2
1 2 r22
(33)
As, d2
x1
is the function of x1, then x1 and factor prices are the unknown
variables, that enter this system. Notice that the ratio of unit costs across
countries depends on values of cuto¤s. In the way, we went from the system (29)
for factor prices to the one equation in w, for costly trade case, we could go to
the equation in x1 and w. We get
1 
1
1+A(x1)w
  1
1 1
w
l
 A(x1)w
  1
1 1
= 
2
1+Bw
  2
1 2
Bw
  2
1 2  w
l
(34)
where A (x1) =

d2
x1
(x1)
h
fx
f
i 1
 1
 1
  1
[1 1]
1
k1
and B = 
  1
1 2
2
1
k2
. The left
side of (34) is increasing in A (x1) and the right side of (34) is decreasing in

  1
1 2
2 . Again, variables on the left side correspond to the sector 1 and variables
on the right side corresponds to the sector 2. The values of w that bring the
denominator of the left and right sides to zero are wl (x1) = [A1 (x1) l]
1 1 and
wr = [Bl]
1 2. Since country 1 has the comparative advantage in sector 1, we
have wl (x1) < wr. So, the behavior of left and right sides of this equation and
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the determination of w is similar to ones for equation (30) (gure: Equation
(30)).
Finally, the inequality below (that comes from the fact wl (x1) < w < wr)
is necessary for valid transition from system (33) to equation (34) (similarly to
free trade case).
A (x1)w
  1
1 1 < w
l
< Bw
  2
1 2 (35)
Similar to (31), we have following expressions for rentals on capital
r11 = r
a
1
1+[1 ]2
1+[1 ]2 1+A(x1)w
  1
1 1
1+Bw
  2
1 2
r12 = r
a
2
1+[1 ]2
[1 ]2+1 1+Bw
  2
1 2
1+A(x1)w
  1
1 1
(36)
Relation between countrys and industrys incomes
Conditions (27) and (26) lead
+ [1  ] 1+
I21
I11
1+
I22
I12
= 1 + [1  2] I21I11 .
where i (xi) =
1
1+
fx(xi)
f(di)
with  (x) =
1Z
x


x
 1
g () d. Using the expres-
sions for I2l
I1l
with l = 1; 2, we get
+ [1  ] 1+A(x1)w
  1
1 1
1+Bw
  2
1 2
= 1 + [1  2]A (x1)w 
1
1 1 . (37)
Conditions (34) and (37) specify the relationships between w and x1. Jointly,
they determine the equilibrium values of w and x1. Lets look closely at expres-
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sion (37).
Some preliminary comparative statics (properties)
1. @A(x1)
@x1
is negative. First bA (d2; x1) =  1[1 1] hbd2   bx1i. Then given
the expression (20), we have
bd2bx1 =
1  bd1bx1
1  bx2bd2
.
According to inequality (19), we have
bd2bx1 = 1 + 11 + 12 < 1.
We can conclude that @A(x1)
@x1
is negative
2. @[1 2]A(x1)
@x1
is positive for small enough 1. First, lets introduce
notations  (d2; x2) = 1   2 (d2; x2) and y =  (d2; x2)A (d2; x1).
Then we have
by =  1
[1 1]
hbd2   bx1i+ [   1] 2 hbd2   bx2i+ fd2g(d2)bd2 fxd2g(x2) 12 bx2
f
R1
d2
h

d2
i 1
g()d
2
Equivalently, we have
by = [   1] h 1
[1 1]
1
1+1
+ 1
2
h
1  1
[1 1]
1
1+1
ii bd2 + fd2g(d2)bd2 fxd2g(x2) 12 bx2
f
R1
d2
h

d2
i 1
g()d
2
If  [1  1] > 1, then by > 0. So, we can conclude that @[1 2]A(x1)@x1 >
0.
53
3. @A(x1l)
@ l
is positive We need to nd the derivative of d2l
x1l
(x1l)  l with
respect to  l. As x1l stays xed (partial derivative with respect to  l), we
only need to check the behavior of  ld2l. From the third equation of the
system 13, we will get x2l = d2l
2
l
h
fxl
fl
i 2
 1 d1l
x1l
. Now, substituting this
expression into second equation of the system 32, we will have
fl
1Z
y 1
l
"

y 1
l
 1
  1
#
g () d+ fxl
1Z
z
h

z
 1   1i g () d = fe
where y =  ld2l and z = y
h
fx
f
i 2
 1 d1
x1
. After di¤erentiation, we have
d( ld2l)
 ld2l
=
fl
1Z
d2l
h

d2l
i 1
g()d fxl
1Z
x2l
h

x2l
i 1
g()d
fl
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d2l
h

d2l
i 1
g()d+fxl
1Z
x2l
h

x2l
i 1
g()d
d l
 l
(38)
As fxl < fl and d2l < x2l,  ld2l increases with  l.
4. @[1 2l]
@ l
is negative and @[1 2l]A(x1l)
@ l
is negative for small enough l
Basically, we will need to nd the derivative with respect to of
1
1+
fl
R1
d2l


d2l
 1
g()d
fxl
R1
x2l


x2l
 1
g()d
[d2l l]
 1
[1 l]
We already have expression for derivative d( ld2l)
d l
, so we need to nd the
derivative of the rst multiplier. First, lets nd dd2l
d l
and dx2l
d l
. By taking
the complete di¤erential of the second and the third equations of the system
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32 for the case of xed x1l (d1l in this case is xed too), we could nd
expressions for dd2l
d l
and dx2l
d l
. Now, substituting these expressions into the
formula for the complete di¤erential of the rst multiplier, we have
d
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At this point, we can conclude that @[1 2l]
@ l
has negative sign. Finally, we
have
 l
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d2l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[1 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2   
where  is positive expression. We could guarantee that the expression
above is negative if following condition holds l < 1   12 . So, for small
enough l,
@[1 2l]A(x1l)
@ l
is negative.
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5. 2x1 (w), dened by the expression (37) is increasing function.
The right side of expression (37) is decreasing in w. Lets take the derivative
of the left side with respect to w. Lets denote A = A (x1)
1
k1
and B =

  1
1 1
2
1
k2
. Then
1+Aw
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2
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1 2Bw
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1 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ABw
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If 2  1, then given inequality (35), the left side of expression (37) is
increasing in w. To bring the equality in expression (37), when x1 increased, w
should increase. So, the relationship 2x1 (w), dened by the expression (37), is
positive.
Proof of Proposition 3 and of Proposition 4
Proof. We substitute out 1+Bw 
2
1 2 from expressions (34) and (37), we have
0 = [1  ]
h
1 + Aw
  1
1 1
i
  1
2
h
w
l
  Aw 
1
1 1
i
 
  1 + w
l
 h
1   + [1  2]Aw 
1
1 1
i (39)
Notice, the right side of this expression is decreasing in x1. Lets take the
derivative of the right side with respect to w, we have
h
  1   12
i
1
l
+ 1
1 1
h
  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12
i
Aw
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1 1 + 21 1
1 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1
l
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1 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We could guarantee that this expression is negative if    1   12 < 0,
[1  2]   [1  ]   12 < 0 and 1 
1
2
. Recall that 1 > i >
1
2
. Then, the
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Figure 6: Changes in x1 and w, when  2 decreases
stronger versions of rst two inequalities are implied by    1
2
 1
2
. So, the
expression on the right side is decreasing in w and x1. That means that the
locus 1x1 (w) corresponding to the expression (39) is decreasing function.
Also, we established that the locus 2x1 (w) corresponding to the expression
(37) is increasing function. The crossing of these curves corresponds to the
equilibrium.
Notice, that the decrease in  2 leads to the vertical downward shift of the
curve 2x1 (w) in case country 1 has the comparative disadvantage in sector 2.
So, the decrease in  2 causes the increase in w and the decrease in x1. It implies
the increase in d1 or the increase in average productivity of rms in sector 1. In
the same way, it could be shown that x1 increases in response to the decrease
in  2, if country 1 has the comparative advantage in sector 2 and comparative
disadvantage in sector 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. After substituting the expression (2) for demand into the expression
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(23) for utility, we will get that the utility level of agent with the income Ii is
Ui = 
 [1  ][1 ] Ii
PilP
1 
il
. So, the changes in welfare of the owner of one unit
of capital in sector l of country 1 are determined by following ratio:
Ua1l
Uf1l
=
ra1l
r1l
h
P11
Pa11
i h
P12
Pa12
i1 
where U f1l is utility level of the owner of one unit of capital in sector l of
country 1 in free trade regime. Increase in welfare corresponds to U
a
1l
Uf1l
< 1. For
both industries we have the ratios of price indices in the expression below. At
the same time, rental on capital goes in sector 1 (r
a
11
r11
> 1). So, by showing that
in U
a
11
Uf11
< 1, we will have automatically U
a
1l
Uf1l
< 1.
The ratio of price indices, corresponding to di¤erent trade regimes, can be
expressed as
P fil
Pail
=
h
ril
rail
i1 l hMail
Ml
i 1
 1
.
Both ratios ril
rail
and Mil
Ml
do not depend on  and only determined by factor
endowments of the economy and fl, lg for l = 1; 2. Moreover, we have showed
in the proof of proposition 2 that M
a
il
Ml
< 1 for both industries. So, by making 
close enough to unity, we make P
f
il
Pail
being as small as it is necessary. As result,
we can ensure that U
a
1l
Uf1l
would be smaller than unity.
For the owner of the unit of labor, we have following ratio of utilities
Ua1l
Uf1l
=
h
P11
Pa11
i h
P12
Pa12
i1 
Again, by choosing  close enough to unity, this ratio will be smaller than
unity. So, there is  such that for any  < , the owner of any factor will be
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better o¤ from trade liberalization (autarky to free trade).
At the same time, substituting the expression for the ratio of price indices
into the expression for the ratio of utility levels of the owner of unit of capital in
sector 1 and 2, we get
Ua11
Uf11
=
h
ra11
r11
i1 [1 1] h r12
ra12
i[1 2][1 ] hMa11
M1
i 
 1
h
Ma12
M2
i 1 
 1
,
Ua12
Uf12
=
h
ra12
r12
i1 [1 2][1 ] h r11
ra11
i[1 1] hMa11
M1
i 
 1
h
Ma12
M2
i 1 
 1
.
For su¢ ciently high  > , the inuence of increase in mass of available
varieties will have small e¤ect on ratio of utility levels as
h
Mail
Ml
i l
 1
would be
close to unity. Given, r11 increases and r12 decreases, we have
Ua11
Uf11
< 1 and
Ua12
Uf12
> 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Lets introduce notations Al =

d2l
x1l
(x1l)
h
fxl
fl
i 1
 1
 l
  1
[1 ]
1
kl
and il =
1
1+
fxl(xil)
fl(dil)
.
Similar to free trade case, the relations between the expenditure on labor and
sector specic capitals in both countries, the goods market clearing condition
(14), the relationship (12) between unit costs across countries in sector 1 and
similar relation for sector 2 can be combined to the system of equations (we
normalized the w1 to unity), in which rst three equations would be exactly like
in the system (29). While last two conditions will modify to
A1r11 = w

1  r21
A2r12 = w
2
1 2 r22
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So that, we have following expression in w:
[1  ] 1+A1w 

1 
w
l
 A1w 

1 
=  1+A2w
  
1 
A2w
  
1   w
l
(40)
Notice that given the symmetry in the endowment structure, we have w =
l = 1. The inequality similar to the inequality (35), for this model will be
A1w
  
1  < 1 < A2w
  
1  . (41)
Also, we have the modied expression for the returns to capital
r11 = r
a
1
1
+[1 ] 1+A1w
  
1 
1+A2w
  
1 
r12 = r
a
2
1
[1 ]+ 1+A2w
  
1 
1+A1w
  
1 
(42)
Lets take complete di¤erential of the left side of equation (40). We will get
dw
w
L = 

h
1 + A2w
  
1 
i2
w 

1  @A1
@x11
dx11
+ [1 ]

h
1 + A1w
  
1 
i2
w 

1  @A2
@x12
dx12 +


h
1 + A2w
  
1 
i2
w 

1  @A1
@1
d 1
(43)
where L is of following form
L = 1 

h
1 + [1  ] 1 

i

1 A2w
  
1 
h
1 + A1w
  
1 
i2
+
+ [1  ] 

h
A1w
  
1  + A2w
  
1 
i h
1 + A1w
  
1 
i h
1 + A2w
  
1 
i
+
+

h
1 + 1 

i

1 A1w
  
1 
h
1 + A2w
  
1 
i2
For every sector we will have expression similar to the expression (37). Par-
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ticularly, we have for sector 1
+ [1  ] 1+A1w 

1 
1+A2w
  
1 
= 11 + [1  21]A1w 

1  (44)
and we have following expression for sector 2
[1  ] +  1+A2w 

1 
1+A1w
  
1 
= 12 + [1  22]A2w 

1  (45)
We can take the complete di¤erential each of equations (44) and (45):
C1dx11 +B1dx12 =
= 1
dw
w
+

[1  ] 1
1+A2w
  
1 
w 

1  @A1
@1
  w  1  @[1 21]A1
@1

d 1
(46)
C2dx11 + A2dx12 =
= 2
dw
w
   1+A2w 

1 
1+A1w
  
1 
2w  1  @A(x11)@1 d 1 (47)
where Cl and Bl are dened as
Cl =
@1l
@x1l
+ @[1 2l]Al
@x1l
w 

1    k
@Al
@x1l
w
  
1 
1+Akw
  
1 
,
Bl = k
1+Alw
  
1 
1+Akw
  
1 
2 @Ak@x1kw 

1  .
Also, for i we have following expression:
l =

1  [1  1l] + k 1  Alw
  
1   Akw 

1 
1+Akw
  
1 
2 Akw  1  =
= 
1  [1  2l]Alw 

1  + k

1 
Akw
  
1   Alw 

1 
1+Akw
  
1 
2
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After substituting the expression for dw from condition (43) into the expres-
sions and we will get the system of equations in dx11 and dx12, which can be
solved for dx11 and dx12. For dx11 we get
dx11 =
 G3 @[1 21]A1@1 w
  
1  +G2
@A1
@1
 G1 @A2@x12
@A1
@1
G3

@11
@x11
+
@[1 21]A1
@x11
w
  
1 

 G2 @A1@x11+G1
@A2
@x12
@A1
@x11
d 1 (48)
where G1, G2 and G3 are positive expressions, given properties 1-5. So, x11
decreases, as  1 goes down. Moreover, this result does not depend on sector
being abundant with capital. As result, with decrease in variable trade cost in
particular sector, the average productivity of rms in this sector increases.
For dx12 we have following expression after simplication.
dx12 =
1
det
242  1L h1 + A2w  1  i2    1+A2w  1 
1+A1w
  
1 
2
35

h
@11
@x11
@A1
@1
+
h
@[1 21]
@x11
@A1
@1
  @[1 21]
@1
@A1
@x11
i
A1w
  
1 
i
w 

1  d 1
(49)
It could be shown that det, the determinant of the system of equations re-
sulted from substituting the expression (43) for dw into expressions (46) and
(47), is positive.
Lets show that the expression in the rst parenthesis has negative sign.
After substituting the expressions for 2 and L, following inequality will imply
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the negative sign of the expression in the rst parenthesis
1  12 <
< [1  ]
241 + 1 

+ 1 

A1w
  
1  +A2w
  
1  A2w
  
1 
1+A1w
  
1 

A2w
  
1 
35
 A2w 

1 
1+A2w
  
1 
+ 2 1 

A1w
  
1 

1+A2w
  
1 


1+A1w
  
1 
2 +  A1w  1 
1+A1w
  
1 
(50)
where the right side is bounded from below by [1  ]
h
1 + 1 

i
A2w
  
1 
1+A2w
  
1 
.
Taking into account inequality (41), we receive
[1  ]

1 +
1  


1
2
< [1  ]

1 +
1  


A2w
  
1 
1 + A2w
  
1 
Given 1   12 (x12) < 12 , the inequality (50) is satised for small enough .
Now, lets show that the expression in second parenthesis of expression (49) is
positive.
@11
@x11
@A1
@1
+
h
@[1 21]
@x11
@A1
@1
  @[1 21]
@1
@A1
@x11
i
A1w
  
1  =
= @[1 21]
@x11
@A1
@1

1 

@[1 21]
@1
@A1
@x11
@[1 21]
@x11
@A1
@1
  1

A1w
  
1 
 (51)
Given the cost parameters are the same across sectors, the inequality k1 > k2
leads to x11 > x12. So, it could be shown that
@Bd(x11)
@1
@A(x11)
@x11
@Bd(x11)
@x11
@A(x11)
@1
< 2
Finally, given A1w
  
1  < 1, we could guarantee that the expression (51) is
positive.
We can conclude that for the case, country 1 has more capital in sector 1
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than country 2 (K11 > K21) and the countrys endowment of capital in sector
2 is smaller then in country 2 (K12 < K22), then the decrease in variable trade
cost in the sector abundant with capital (sector 1) leads to the increase in other
sector (sector 2) exporting productivity cuto¤.
Again, the decrease in  2 from point of view of country 2 leads to the increase
in x21, as sector 2 is abundant with capital there. According to the system (32),
x11 decreases and d11 increases in this case. So, the increase in variable trade
cost in sector scarce with capital leads to the increase in other sector exporting
productivity cuto¤.
As, we can see from equation (43), the decrease in  1 has the direct negative
e¤ect on w. At the same time, the decrease in x11 caused by the decrease in  1
lowers w, while the increase in 12 would magnify the direct e¤ect of the decrease
in  1. Lets demonstrate that the direct e¤ect of the decrease in  1 dominates
the secondary e¤ect of the decrease in x11.
Particularly, we should show that the expression in parenthesis
h
@A1(x11)
@x11
dx11
d1
+ @A1(x11)
@1
i
d 1
has positive sign. Using expression (48), for the above expression we get
G3
@Bx(x11)
@x11
@A1(x11)
@1
+
h
@Bd(x11)
@x11
@A1(x11)
@1
  @A1(x11)
@x11
@Bd(x11)
@1
i
A1(x11)w
  
1 
G3
"
@Bx(x11)
@x11
+
@Bd(x11)A1(x11)
@x11
w
  1
1 1
#
 G2 @A(x11)@x11 +G1
@A2(x12)
@x12
@A1(x11)
@x11
d 1
And we have demonstrated that the numerator has positive sign. So, the expres-
sion in parenthesis has positive sign.
So, w (equivalently w2
w1
) decrease with the decrease in  1. From the point of
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view of country 2, the decrease in  2 leads to the decrease in w1w2 or to the increase
in w.
With the decrease in  1, the right side of equation (45) goes up, as w decreases
and x12 increases. The decrease in the left side of this equation leads to the
increase in r11 and to the decrease in r12, according to the system (36). Similarly,
with the decrease in  2, the right side of equation (44) go down, as w increases
and x12 decreases. The decrease in the left side leads to the increase in r11 and
to the decrease in r12. So, the e¤ect of the increase in variable trade cost on the
rentals on capital does not depend on sector the increase occurred in.
65
REFERENCES
Aw, B., Chung, S. and Roberts, M. (2000) Productivity and turnover in the ex-
port market: micro-level evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan
(China), World Bank Economic Review, 14, 65-90.
Balassa, B. (1966) Tari¤ reductions and trade in manufactures among the in-
dustrial countries, American Economic Review, 56, 466-473.
Bergstrand, J. (1989) The generalized gravity equation, monopolistic competi-
tion, and the factor-proportions theory in international trade, The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 71, 143-153
Bernard, A., Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2003) Plants and productivity in inter-
national trade, American Economic Review, 93, 1268-1290.
Bernard A. and Jensen J. (1999) Exceptional exporter performance: cause,
e¤ect, or both?, Journal of International Economics, 47, 1-25.
Bernard, A., Redding, S. and Schott, P. (2007) Comparative advantage and
heterogeneous rms, Review of Economic Studies, 74, 31-66.
Bond, E. (1986) Entrepreneurial ability, income distribution, and international
trade, Journal of International Economics, 20, 343-356.
Clerides, S., Lach, S., Tybout, J. (1998) Is learning by exporting important?
Micro-dynamic evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113, 903-947.
Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J. (1977) Monopolistic competition and optimum product
diversity, American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S., Samuelson, P. (1980) Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory
with a continuum of goods, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 203-224.
Dornbush, R., Fischer, S., Samuelson, P. (1977) Comparative advantage, trade,
and payments in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods, American
Economic Review, 67, 823-839.
Eaton, J., Kortum, S. (2002) Technology, geography, and trade, Econometrica,
70, 1741-1779.
66
Grubel, H. (1967) Intraindustry specialization and the pattern of trade, Cana-
dian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 33, 374-388.
Helpman, E. (1999) The structure of foreign trade, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 13, 121-144.
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985) Market structure and foreign trade,
Cambbridge: MIT Press.
Hopenhayn, H. (1992) Entry, exit and rm dynamics in long run equilibrium,
Econometrica, 60, 1127-1150.
Hufbauer, C. and Chilas, J. (1974) Specialization by industrial countries: ex-
tent and consequences, in Giersch, H. The international division of labor:
problems and perspectives.
Jones, R. (1971) A three-factor model in theory, trade and history, In Jagdish
Bhagwati et al., eds., Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth: Papers in
International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Krugman, P. (1981) Intraindustry specialization and the gains from trade, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 89, 959-973.
Krugman, P. (1979) Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and interna-
tional trade, Journal of International Economics, 9, 469-479.
Mayer, W. (1974) Short and long run equilibria for a small open economy,
Journal of Political Economy, 82, 955-967.
Melitz, M. (2003) The impact of trade on intraindustry reallocations and ag-
gregate industry productivity, Econometrica, 71, 1695-1725.
Mussa, M. (1974) Tari¤s and the distribution of income: the importance of
factor specicity, substitutability, and intensity in the short run and long
run, Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1191-1203.
Neary, P. (1978) Short-run capital specicity and the pure theory of interna-
tional trade, The Economic Journal, 88, 488-510.
Pavcnik, N. (2002) Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements:
evidence from Chilean plants, Review of Economic Studies, 69, 245-276.
Romalis, J. (2004) Factor proportions and the structure of commodity trade,
The American Economic Review, 94, 67-97.
67
Stolper, W. and Samuelson, P. (1941) Protection and real wages, Review of
Economic Studies, 9, 58-73.
68
